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1.  Summary 
Austria – at least from an international comparative perspective – shows rather 
encompassing strategies and measures in all three policy strands addressed upon by 
the EC in its’ 2008 recommendation on the “active inclusion of people excluded from 
the labour market” (i.e. income support, inclusive labour markets and quality 
services). However, what is missing is an overall and comprehensive strategy which is 
– based on a critical assessment of existing systems - proactively dealing with the 
weaknesses and challenges of the major schemes established. At the same time it 
appears that the problem awareness of Austrian political decision makers regarding 
the three policy strands of active inclusion and their policy sub-fields is somewhat 
biased. Furthermore, some possible strategies and measures appear to be rather 
contested, making pro-active reform less likely, whereas in other policy fields 
widespread consensus is dominating, leading to a further reinforcement of the 
respective strategic pathway. 
Within the area of “adequate income support” some major reform steps were taken 
over the last years, at first instance in context of replacing social assistance by the so-
called “Guaranteed Minimum Income” scheme (GMI). The declared goal was a 
substantial harmonisation of the social assistance schemes of the federal provinces – a 
goal, which however, as now gets visible, has only been reached partially. Although 
respective evaluations are still under way, available data (limited as they may be) 
point to the direction that non take-up will to some degree get reduced within GMI. 
But at the same time the change towards GMI did not address the problem of 
insufficient benefit levels in a structural way. The same is true for benefits from 
unemployment insurance, where wage replacement rates appear to be rather low from 
an international comparative point of view (especially after preceding low-wage 
employment). On the other hand, benefits from social assistance / GMI and 
unemployment insurance did at least not get retrenched within the austerity packages 
of 2010 and 2012, and family allowances, which as well reduce the likelihood of being 
at-risk-of poverty substantially in Austria, have only been cut to some minor degree. 
Regarding the policy area of “inclusive labour markets”, the situation appears to be 
two sided. On the one hand Austria shows a rather elaborated system of ALMP-
measures and personalised services aiming at improving the employment chances of 
people with low qualification or other problems, making it difficult for them to find a 
(permanent) job. Respective measures got substantially expanded over the last two 
decades and to a large degree as well during the times when the impact of the 
financial and economic crisis was most severe in Austria. Furthermore, specifically 
targeted programmes got expanded to some degree, most recently with a focus on 
young people and as well regarding recipients of GMI. 
On the other hand, questions of low wage employment, in-work poverty, precarious 
jobs or labour market segmentation did not attract much attention by the most 
important political actors. Here, strategies concentrate on the aim to increase equality 
of employment chances of women, however only applying measures of soft-
governance at first instance (like information campaigns, awareness raising etc.). 
More structural questions like wage inequalities (and the possible strategy to stipulate 
a higher minimum wage) or the re-distribution of working time are very rarely 
addressed, with the consequence that as much no reforms took place in these policy-
areas (apart of introducing – within the reform package of the GMI - a minimum wage 
of 1,000 EUR gross as from 2009/2010, which however had only marginal direct 
effects, as most sectorial wage agreements anyhow stipulated higher minimum wages 
at this time). 
 
 
 
Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion 
Country Report - Austria 
 
    2012  8 
Concerning “quality services”, deficits are most evident regarding institutional 
childcare and long-term care. Here, accessibility varies to a large degree between the 
federal provinces, which are responsible for providing respective services. A related 
situation appears concerning housing services and services for the homeless. Overall, 
the situation has to some degree been improving concerning childcare (apart of other 
things due to incentives set by the national government in form of co-financing new 
childcare facilities), whereas in the area of long-term care even a lack of sound 
empirical evidence exists concerning the actual respective situation in the federal 
provinces. This topic is on the agenda as well to some degree (with the central 
government currently installing a long-term care database for collecting and providing 
respective information), but improvements in uniformity of service accessibility may 
not be expected in the short run. The question of housing services and services for the 
homeless are completely missing on the political agenda of the national government, 
with huge regional differentiations enduring. Regarding health services it is fair to say 
that the Austrian health systems provides rather equal access to high-quality health 
services, and that it is subject to comparatively low private co-payments for standard 
treatments. Reforms decided over the last years follow the aim to maintain this rather 
favourable situation, but at the same time to make the system more efficient and to 
solve problems of financial sustainability. 
To improve the Austrian strategy for active inclusion it would be necessary that the 
national government assess all policy subfields of the three strands in an unbiased 
way to name strengths, weaknesses and challenges according to evidence based 
findings. Such assessment should as well address “difficult” topics like wage 
inequalities or the distribution of working time, where strong group interests exist. In 
a related way, questions of the accessibility of services (in the areas of childcare, long-
term care and housing) should be dealt with more pro-actively by the national 
government, irrespective of resistance in some federal provinces. 
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2.  Integrated comprehensive strategies 
The Commission Recommendation of 3.10.2008 on the “active inclusion of people 
excluded from the labour market” asks the European member states to "design and 
implement an integrated comprehensive strategy for the active inclusion of people 
excluded from the labour market combining adequate income support, inclusive labour 
markets and access to quality services” (European Commission 2008). 
It appears that Austria – at least from an international comparative perspective – 
shows rather encompassing strategies and measures in all three policy strands 
addressed upon by the EC (i.e. income support, inclusive labour markets and quality 
services). However, it is fair to say that Austria did not explicitly design one integrated 
and comprehensive strategy for the active inclusion of people excluded from the 
labour market. In other words: what is missing is an overall and comprehensive 
strategy which is – based on a critical assessment of existing systems - proactively 
dealing with the weaknesses and challenges of the major established schemes. The 
latter is true despite of some positive attempts made during the last years, especially 
the replacement of most parts of traditional extramural social assistance by the new 
Guaranteed Minimum Income Scheme (GMI), which – inter alia – follows the aim to 
streamline the minimum income schemes operated and administered by the nine 
federal provinces (Länder). 
2.1 Comprehensive policy design 
Overall, it appears that the problem awareness of Austrian political decision makers 
regarding the three policy strands of active inclusion and their policy sub-fields is 
somewhat biased. At the same time some possible strategies and measures appear to 
be rather contested, making pro-active reform less likely, whereas in other policy 
fields widespread consensus is dominating, leading to a further reinforcement of the 
respective strategic pathway. 
The question of adequate income support has been on the agenda during the last four 
years to some degree, especially in the context of the already mentioned replacement 
of social assistance by GMI.  
One of the aims of the replacement of social assistance by GMI was to “harmonise” 
the rules applying for minimum income across the nine federal provinces and to 
guarantee their largely uniform implementation. However, the replacement of social 
assistance by GMI does not rest on general nation-wide legislation, but only on a so 
called 15a-agreement1 between the national state and the federal provinces. This 
agreement only defines the most important features of the GMI, whereas more 
detailed regulation has to be stipulated by nine different acts of the federal provinces. 
A recent evaluation by the Armutskonferenz2 (2012a; 2012b) points to the direction 
that the nine different acts - irrespective of the original goal of harmonisation -, 
enclose a substantial degree of differentiation. The latter does not only apply for 
specific technical questions in actual implementation, but as well for maximum benefit 
levels applicable in the nine federal provinces, whereby the 15a-agreement only 
defines a minimum level of benefits. At the same time it is worth noting that within 
the political debates about the GMI no evidence based discussion on the adequacy of 
benefits took place. And both the minimum benefit level (as stipulated in the 15a-
agreement), as well as the actual level of benefits within the GMI-schemes of the 
federal provinces have remained to be set “arbitrarily”, i.e. not according to any 
                                           
 
1  This is an agreement according to paragraph 15a of the Austrian Federal Constitution. 
2  Die Armutskonferenz (=EAPN Austria) is a network of more than 30 national organizations and three 
regional networks (Salzburg, Carinthia and Upper Austria). Most members are social NGOs. 
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objective threshold like e.g. the at-risk-of-poverty threshold or e.g. a household 
reference budget (see section 3.1.1 below for more details). Furthermore, the GMI 
overall did not lead to much changes in benefit levels3 (when compared to earlier 
social assistance), but only to some minor increase in federal provinces where under 
the social assistance scheme benefit levels where lower than the minimum level now 
agreed upon, and in federal provinces which had benefit levels higher than the 
minimum level now agreed upon they remained at the same level (according to a “rule 
of no impairment”, as well enclosed in the 15a-agreement). 
At the same time debates on the level of benefits within unemployment insurance 
remained to be a rare phenomenon. Here, some political players (from opposition and 
governing political parties and within trade unions) repeatedly urged an increase in 
wage replacement rates, but no major respective measures got decided due to 
resistance of other political actors, who even refused to put the topic on the agenda. 
The only exemption here is an increase of the maximum wage replacement rate within 
unemployment assistance, which may – however means tested against other 
household income – be granted after the right for unemployment benefit has expired 
due to reaching the respective maximum periods (see below section 3.1 for more 
details). 
What at the same time should be stressed is the fact that the austerity measures 
decided from 2011 onwards did not enclose cutbacks in monetary transfers from 
unemployment insurance and minimum income schemes. Retrenchment measures in 
monetary transfers – apart of some punctual measures concerning family benefits - at 
first instance focused on limiting access to invalidity pensions and early retirement, 
and were combined with a proactive approach for increasing the employability of older 
workers or workers with health problems (see below chapters 3.2 and 3.3). 
Regarding “inclusive labour markets”, a widespread consensus exists in case of Austria 
regarding the usefulness and reasonableness of measures of active labour market 
policy (ALMP). Respective measures got considerably expanded during the crisis and 
even after later budget cutbacks respective spending remained on a rather high level 
(at least from an international comparative point of view). Respective measures both 
enclose more general instruments and instruments targeted at specific groups and 
they get regularly and pro-actively adapted according to changing labour market 
conditions. Furthermore, in the course of the replacement of social assistance by GMI, 
further attempts have been made to integrate beneficiaries of the minimum income 
scheme to ALMP-measures, but it appears that respective proceedings are not uniform 
in the nine federal provinces. More recently, it got announced that more funds will be 
made available to improve the employability of older workers and workers with health 
problems, where it is planned that rehabilitation measures will get expanded. 
At the same time other policy subareas of the inclusive labour markets-strand have 
been getting much less political attention. This holds for questions of low pay, of in-
work-poverty (irrespective of a “general” minimum wage of 1,000 EUR gross to be 
implemented via collective agreements as from 2010) and labour market 
segmentation. If related questions got addressed upon at all, it has at first instance 
been with a focus on the gender-pay-gap, which is very high in Austria from an 
international comparative perspective. At the same time respective measures – overall 
– appear to narrow down to a number of attempts of the type of soft governance, like 
information campaigns and awareness raising etc. What however should be stressed is 
                                           
 
3  However, one substantial change worth mentioning is that GMI led to higher benefits for single parents 
in most federal provinces. Within social assistance, in all federal provinces (except of Vienna) single 
parents only got the lower rate for “main recipients”, not the higher rate dedicated at “sole recipients” 
(see Fink/Grand 2009, 15 for the respective reference rates in earlier social assistance). Now, they get 
the same benefit rate as “single recipients’. 
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that – contrary to many other EU Member States – the coverage rate of collective 
agreements is very high in Austria (reportedly about 99% in the private sector). 
Only little progress has been made regarding problems within the tax system and the 
system of social insurance contributions, where the tax wedge remains to be 
comparatively high in Austria. 
Problems are as well evident regarding “quality services”. Here, one has to 
differentiate between services which predominantly fall within the competency of the 
national state, and services where the federal provinces and the municipalities play a 
larger role (in many cases both in the area of decision making and implementation). 
Overall, enacting comprehensive policies appears to be easier and more regularly 
achieved in policy areas where competencies are largely pooled at the level of the 
national state, like e.g. ALMP. In the area of health, quality and accessibility is (from 
an international comparative perspective) rather high in virtually all regions in Austria, 
but shared competencies and complicated financing structures have traditionally lead 
to reform blockades regarding strategies and measures aiming at cost containment 
and financial sustainability. 
Regarding some other social services, a large differentiation regarding the level of 
development and accessibility is evident when the different federal provinces are 
compared to each other. This e.g. holds for social services in the area of housing, for 
institutional childcare and for services dedicated to people in need for long-term care. 
Related problems have been on the political agenda to some degree over the last four 
years (especially regarding childcare and long-term care), but progress in the 
alignment of respective arrangements is still rather limited and there is an evident 
lack in pro-active and more enhancing coordinated strategies (but see for recent 
attempts in the area of long-term care below chapter 3.3). 
Policy reform in the area of education to some degree as well suffers from shared 
responsibilities between the national state and the federal provinces (especially 
regarding lower secondary education), but as well from large ideological disagreement 
between different political players. However, some progress has more recently been 
made in this area, as all former lower secondary schools (Hauptschulen) will be 
transferred into the model of the New Secondary Schools (Neue Mittelschulen) until 
2018/2019. This reform will in all likelihood not solve all structural problems of the 
Austrian model of primary and lower secondary education, as the principle of tracking 
pupils at the very early age of 10 remains to be in place (a feature criticized by the 
vast majority of experts dealing with questions of childhood education in Austria; see 
– with more literature references – e.g. OECD 2012, 63). However, replacing former 
lower secondary schools by the New Secondary Schools appears to be a positive step, 
as it goes ahead with changes in didactical concepts, which allow for more 
individualised training and support, as well as with some upgrade regarding resources 
(in terms of the ratio of teachers per pupils). 
Overall, all three strands of policies aiming at “active inclusion of people excluded from 
the labour market” have been on the political agenda in Austria over the last four 
years to some degree. However, it is fair to say that reforms do not follow a 
comprehensive strategy, but that they more follow the logics of incremental 
adaptation, where path-dependency and traditional institutional features of the 
existing systems define important restraints to more pro-active reforms of the type of 
rational and evidence based decision making. Hereby, the existing fragmentation (and 
partly overlapping) of competencies appears to be of major relevance regarding a 
number of policy areas in the field of social services (especially housing, long-term 
care and institutionalised childcare), whereas concerning questions of adequacy of 
benefit levels or low pay and in-work-poverty problem awareness by the relevant 
decision makers appears to be overall very limited.  
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What is as well largely missing is, as already mentioned above, an overall strategy, 
which a) would deliberately try to identify challenges and weaknesses within the three 
strands of active inclusion and their mutual interaction and b) would follow an 
evidence based and clear-cut strategy to overcome these problems and challenges.  
2.2 Integrated implementation 
Regarding “integrated implementation” it appears to be useful to differentiate between 
a) Integrated implementation within one policy area or policy sub-area and  
b) the level of integration between different policy-areas and policy sub-areas. 
 
The first point – inter alia - addresses the question if and to what degree policies rest 
on /are linked to clear-cut rules and procedural mechanisms, which lead to a largely 
uniform implementation across different places or regions. The opposite would be a 
situation where a very large degree of “room for interpretation” exists within the 
implementation of respective measures, leading to a situation where arbitrariness 
prevails and where legal certainty is low. 
The second question is if and to what degree implementation of policies is co-
ordinated across policy-areas. This goal may be acquired by institutional integration 
(e.g. in form of so-called one-stop-shops) or by increased (more or less 
institutionalised) co-ordination and co-operation between different institutions. 
Regarding the first point (i.e. integrated within policy areas and sub-areas) the level of 
integration of implementation varies between policy areas and policy sub-areas. 
Within the policy strand of adequate income support implementation appears to be 
largely integrated and harmonised regarding benefits from unemployment insurance. 
Regarding minimum income schemes, earlier assessments by the Armutskonferenz4 
(2008) showed the implementation of the former system of social assistance varied do 
a large degree even within federal provinces, meaning that respective rules where 
interpreted in a different way when comparing different welfare offices within one 
federal province (or even within one welfare office, depending on the respective official 
in charge). The introduction of the GMI is likely to have improved the respective 
situation to some degree. However, this reform measure did not go ahead with a real 
harmonisation of the minimum income schemes across the nine federal provinces 
(important differentiations prevail), and the nine different acts on GMI, now existing at 
the level of the federal provinces, appear to leave a rather high level of room for 
interpretation on a number of specific questions (see Armutskonferenz 2012a; 2012b). 
On this background e.g. the regional government of the federal province of Vienna 
published a “guidebook on the implementation” of the GMI, which has no less than 
106 pages. This, according to the Armutskonferenz (2012b) points to the direction of 
“deficient legislation”, where much is left to be covered in implementation provisions, 
which may be more or less encompassing in the different federal provinces and which 
go ahead with low legal certainty, as they e.g. may be changed without a legislative 
act. 
In course of the replacement of social assistance by the GMI it was as well discussed 
to integrate the welfare offices and the offices of the public employment service (PES) 
within one institution as a one-stop-shop. This would have meant a major institutional 
reform, but in the end the respective political actors of the national state, the federal 
provinces and the municipalities could not agree on such a model. What finally got 
                                           
 
4  Die Armutskonferenz (=EAPN Austria) is a network of more than 30 national organizations and three 
regional networks (Salzburg, Carinthia and Upper Austria). Most members are social NGOs. 
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agreed upon is that possible beneficiaries applying for GMI may now hand in their 
application not only at the welfare office, but as well at the PES, which will forward it 
to the welfare offices. At the same time possible beneficiaries afterwards have to deal 
with the welfare office (for means testing and other administrative acts), so that the 
possibility to hand in the initial application at the PES does not go ahead with real 
integration within implementation. 
In the area of “inclusive labour markets”, in a related way, policy implementation got 
as well only partly integrated with the change from social assistance to GMI. Within 
the area of active labour market policies (ALMP) the PES (which is the most important 
provider of ALMP measures) traditionally did often not perceive sole recipients of social 
assistance (i.e. persons not simultaneously getting transfers from the unemployment 
insurance) to be part of its core-clientele, leading to de-facto reduced access to 
training measures etc. Again, no complete integration took place. However, the 15a-
agreement between the national state and the federal provinces explicitly states that 
recipients of GMI should in future have “equal access” to all measures offered by the 
PES and that the federal provinces and municipalities should – in co-operation with the 
PES – develop additional specific ALMP-programmes for recipients of GMI. In the 
meanwhile, such schemes got established in all federal provinces, whereby in some of 
them they are still of the character of pilot-programmes only, eventually to be adapted 
and expanded in future (see Bergmann et al. 2012).  
One more recent measure taken worth mentioning in the context of “inclusive labour 
markets” is the one of the introduction of the so-called “street to health” 
(Gesundheitsstrasse). With this instrument, implemented in all federal provinces as 
from summer 2010, earlier multiple assessments of working capacity (in terms of 
health issues) got abandoned. Before, respective assessments were organized both by 
the PES and the pension insurance providers, often leading to rather long related 
procedures and in some cases to inconsistent results. Now the sole competency for 
assessments of working capacity lies within the pension insurance providers. 
Regarding other issues of “inclusive labour markets”, not much information is available 
on the actual implementation of respective rules and regulations. The latter especially 
holds for the more than 500 sectorial collective agreements, covering around 98 to 
99% of the workforce in the private sector (see e.g. Adam 2011). No valid data are 
available on the question to what degree these agreements are implemented in 
practice and/or how often they turn out to be dead letter. 
In the area of “quality services”, the situation overall appears to be very 
heterogeneous, given the strong competencies of the federal provinces (and 
sometimes even the municipalities) in a number of respective policy areas (see as well 
chapter 2.3 below). For this reason, and as more detailed assessments are largely 
missing, it is hard to judge if and to what degree implementation of “quality services” 
is organised in an integrated way at the level of the federal provinces. One recent 
measure worth mentioning in this area is the one of reforming the institutional 
responsibility for the grading of care necessities in individual cases concerning long-
term care cash benefits (according to the given seven-level model). Here, 
fragmentation got minimized, reducing the number of respective institutions from 303 
(sic!) to eight as from the beginning of 2012. This should lead to higher consistency in 
the implementation of respective rules and to lower administration costs. However, 
the “explanatory notes” (“Materialien”) on the respective bill do not announce to what 
degree administration costs are expected to be reduced.5 
 
                                           
 
5  See: http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/I/I_01208/index.shtml 
 
 
Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion 
Country Report - Austria 
 
    2012  14 
Concerning the question of integration of implementation across different policy areas, 
it appears to be fair to say that fragmentation still outweighs integration. Different to 
some other EU Member States, not much attempts have been made to bundle the 
competencies of implementation of different policy areas of social inclusion in one 
institution (like e.g. the joined local welfare and PES-offices in some Nordic welfare 
states). However, one major exception worth mentioning in this context is the 
introduction of the programme “fit2work”.6 This programme derives from an initiative 
of the national government (presented in 2011), and it is planned that respective 
programmes will be in place in all federal provinces as from the beginning of 2013. 
Fit2work addresses people with health problems and their employers, and follows the 
aim to offer integrated advice regarding health prevention, in cases when health 
issues may lead to job loss, and concerning medical and professional rehabilitation. 
Fit2work offers case management, making use of al services etc. offered by PES 
offices, social insurance providers, the federal social offices (Bundessozialämter) and 
the Health and Safety Executive (Arbeitsinspektorat). Fit 2work got introduced on the 
background of high access rates to invalidity pensions.    
2.3 Vertical policy coordination 
As already mentioned above the question of vertical policy co-ordination among local, 
regional, national (and EU) authorities is evidently an issue in Austria. 
Here, some progress has been made in the area of adequate income support, where 
the replacement of most parts of extramural social assistance by GMI (implemented as 
from September 2010) lead to some alignment of the minimum income schemes run 
by the federal provinces, but, as already mentioned above, not to complete 
harmonisation (see as well Armutskonferenz 2012a; 2012b). 
Within the policy strand of inclusive labour markets, the national government and the 
federal provinces agreed that the recipients of GMI should have equal access to ALMP-
measures offered by the PES in all federal provinces, and that the federal provinces 
together with the regional PES offices should as well offer specific targeted ALMP-
measures for GMI recipients. However, the latter appears to vary to a large degree up 
to now (see above). 
Evidently, substantial challenges regarding vertical co-ordination continue to exist in 
the area of social services.  
As much as no vertical co-ordination exists in the area of housing services and social 
services for the homeless (see e.g. Fink/Grand 2009b; Perl 2008). Here the national 
government appears to take the position that this is not a national issue at all, but one 
solely to be dealt with by the federal provinces and the municipalities. 
Regarding institutional child-care, respective offers and their accessibility varies to a 
substantial degree between the nine federal provinces, whereby Austria - overall – 
shows rather large deficits concerning children in the age below three and as well 
regarding all-day care (see below chapter 3.3). During the recent years the federal 
government made several (however limited) attempts to set incentives for the federal 
provinces to enhance institutional childcare (at first instance via instruments of co-
financing) (see as well below chapter 3.3). 
One other policy area showing related problems is the one of long-term care. Here, 
providing inpatient, outpatient and semi-outpatient services and facilities again falls 
within the competencies of the federal provinces and the municipalities. Only very 
limited data are currently available on the actual respective situations in the nine 
federal provinces, but the ones that are available again point to the direction of 
                                           
 
6  See: http://www.fit2work.at/cms/home 
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substantial differentiation (see below chapter 3.3). The question of stronger vertical 
policy co-ordination in this area has been on the agenda for quite some time, however 
with limited progress up to now. A nation-wide long-term care database has been 
implemented in 2012. It will help to establish a sound starting point for debates about 
structural reform and intensified vertical policy co-ordination, providing information 
necessary to examine inequalities regarding access to outpatient, semi-outpatient and 
inpatient services in the area of long-term care in more detail. One other positive step 
is that it was agreed that legislation and implementation of long-term care cash 
benefits will be a sole competency of the national state as from 2012 (whereas before 
specific groups fell under the competency of the federal provinces implying 
overlapping competencies and inefficiencies) (see Fink 2012a). 
One major challenge of the Austrian health system is the complexity of its 
organisation, coming along with a multitude of relevant decision makers, which include 
- apart from other players - the federal state, the federal provinces and the health 
insurance funds, and a very complex and ramified system of financing. For a long 
time, no real progress could be made regarding these structural questions, 
irrespective of on-going debates between the respective important stakeholders. 
Recent decisions taken within the financial “consolidation package” (dating from 
February 2012), defining the numerical goals of a respective reform concerning cost-
containment, have now speeded up respective developments. In June 2012, a steering 
group, consisting of members representing the national state, the federal provinces 
and the health insurance funds, presented an agreement, stating that planning and 
financing of health services should in future be subject to common understanding 
between these three groups of actors (i.e. the national state, the federal provinces 
and the health insurance providers).7 Furthermore, the agreement as well states that 
the costs of the health system should in future not rise to a larger degree than the 
GDP. However, the details how to implement these plans in more detail are still 
pending, and are subject to a so-called 15a-agreement8 between the national state 
and the federal provinces, which is planned to be formulated over the summer 2012. 
2.4 Active participation of relevant actors 
Austria shows a long and strong tradition of active participation of the social partners 
both in terms of decision making and – to some degree – as well concerning policy 
implementation (see e.g. Tálos 2008). Social partners play an especially important 
role in formulating labour regulation, both concerning respective national legislation 
(where they are always consulted in respective processes of decision making or – even 
more regularly – play a leading role within them) and regarding collective agreements 
(with a coverage rate of nearly 100% in the private sector; see Adam 2011). 
Furthermore, they play a major role concerning the planning and design of ALMP-
measures, as they are members of the organisational boards of the PES (at national, 
regional and local level). As well concerning questions of social protection, the social 
partners get regularly consulted in decision making, and again they as well play a role 
in implementation, being members of the most important boards of the different 
insurance providers. Since 2006, the social partners organise a yearly conference 
(termed the “Bad Ischl Dialogue”)9, and common proposals made on this occasion got 
repeatedly enacted within respective legislation by the national government 
afterwards (most recently concerning the aim to raise the actual retirement age and 
                                           
 
7  See: 
http://www.hauptverband.at/mediaDB/886380_PKU_Gesundheitsreform_AbschlussSteuerungsgruppe_1
3062012.pdf 
8  Regarding the instrument of the 15a-agreement, see above on the GMI. 
9  See http://www.sozialpartner.at/ 
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reducing access to invalidity pensions; see Fink 2012a and Die Sozialpartner 
Österreich 2011). 
Evidently, the Austrian neo-corporatist tradition goes ahead with a privileged position 
of the large social partners’ organisations, whereas other civil society organisations 
etc. are traditionally in a less influential position. This especially holds for their role in 
decision making, where organisations like the Armutskonferenz (which at the same 
time represents EAPN Austria) or their member organisations repeatedly launch 
demands or deliver their (critical) opinion, however with limited direct influence. The 
question of stakeholder participation within the drafting of the Austrian NRPs points to 
a related direction. In earlier years, social NGOs at least got informed within a 
respective meeting with the Federal Chancellery. Regarding the 2012 NRP, no 
consultation took place with social NGOs (according to information provided to the 
author by representatives of Austrian NGOs). Yet, it should be mentioned that a 
regular exchange of opinions takes place with different NGOs within the so-called 
poverty platform, which is organised by the Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs and 
Consumer Protection, however with questionable direct effects on strategies and 
measures. 
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3. Description and assessment of the impact and cost 
effectiveness of measures introduced or planned 
under the 3 strands 
3.1 Adequate income support 
3.1.1 System characteristics and major reforms 
As already mentioned above, the most important reform step taken concerning 
“adequate income support” was the one of replacing most parts of extramural social 
assistance by the so-called guaranteed minimum income scheme (GMI). This reform 
has a rather long history – the question of harmonizing the social assistance schemes 
run by the federal provinces has been on the agenda since the middle of the 1990s 
(see Otter/Pfeil 2011). Then, in 2006, the question got explicitly addressed upon in 
the government programme of the incoming new national government, formed as a 
coalition government of the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the conservative Peoples’ 
Party (ÖVP). What followed were lengthy negotiations between the national state and 
the federal provinces, and it took until 2010 that the national government and the 
federal provinces managed to agree on a treaty according to §15a of the Austrian 
constitution. This treaty outlines the most important features of the GMI, which then 
had to be settled in more detail in legislation decided at the level of the federal 
provinces. The federal provinces Vienna, Lower Austria and Salzburg introduced their 
versions of the GMI as from 01.09.2010. The other six federal provinces followed 
stepwise, with Upper Austria being the last federal province implementing GMI as from 
01.10.2011. 
What is important to notice is that the replacement of social assistance by GMI did not 
lead to a true harmonisation of the minimum income schemes of the federal 
provinces, but more to coordination, defining basic features and minimum standards. 
The central cornerstones of the GMI are – when compared to earlier social assistance 
– the following: 
a) Minimum benefit levels applicable in all federal provinces (and actual benefit rates): 
Within social assistance, cash transfers used to be calculated on the basis of so-called 
reference rates, which to a large degree differed from one federal province to the 
other (see Fink/Grand 2009, 15). Hereby, the term “reference rate” is in that sense 
misleading, as the respective benefit levels were not calculated according to household 
reference budgets (or any other “objective” absolute measure), but arbitrarily set in 
the respective legislations of the federal provinces. Within GMI, the national state and 
the federal provinces agreed to use the so-called equalisation supplement reference 
rate (ESRR) of the old-age insurance (Ausgleichszulagenrichtsatz) as the dominant 
point of orientation. This equalisation supplement reference rate stipulates the 
minimum benefit in the Austrian old-age insurance system.10 However, same as with 
the earlier reference rates in social assistance, the equalisation supplement reference 
rate is again not defined by any “objective” absolute (like household reference 
budgets) or relative (like the “EU-at-risk-of-poverty-threshold” defined as 60% of the 
equalised median net income) measure, but again set arbitrarily. 
                                           
 
10 Note: The Austrian statutory pension system does not provide for an unconditional minimum pension for 
persons beyond a certain age. However, the so-called “equalisation supplement” (“Ausgleichszulage”) 
may - on a partly means-tested basis - apply for persons who are, in principle, eligible to a pension 
entitlement. This means that pensions of low benefit level may be raised to the so-called “equalisation 
supplement reference rate” in case of financial indigence. Thereby, apart from the pensioner’s income, 
the income of spouses or partners is taken into account (but not assets). 
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In 2012, for a single person living alone, the equalisation supplement reference rate 
amounts to EUR 773.26 net per month. Within old-age insurance, this amount is not 
only granted twelve times per year, but in fact 14 times per year, summing up to a 
yearly net benefit of EUR 10,826. The latter (granting GMI 14 times per year) does not 
apply within GMI, although the original plans pointed to this direction. But in summer 
2009 the ÖVP signalled that it would not be willing to agree on such a model, but 
instead claimed that the GMI should be granted 12 times per year only (but still 
applying the equalisation supplement reference rate as the dominant point of 
orientation) (see Otter/Pfeil 2011, 219). The main argument brought forward was that 
this was necessary to prevent that the GMI could turn out as a “social hammock” and 
to make sure that incentives to take part in working life would not be undermined. The 
SPÖ, being the coalition partner of ÖVP in government, gave in, irrespective of inner-
party criticism on doing so. 
Concerning the calculation the respective minimum benefits for different household 
compositions, a weighting system is used which is based on the modified OECD-scale 
of equivalency (as well used at EU-level for calculating the at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold), but in a somewhat modified way (to take account of family benefits, which 
are of universal character in Austria). These minimum benefit levels, as agreed upon 
between the national state and the federal provinces in the 15a treaty, are outlined in 
table 1 below. 
 
Table 1:  GMI minimum benefit levels according to the 15a treaty, incl. and 
excl. 25% “housing allowance”; granted 12 times per year 
 
  
Incl. 25% “housing 
allowance” 
Excl. 25% “housing 
allowance” 
Attributes of person 
Weighting / 
% of the 
ESRR* 
Net 
benefit in 
EUR  
Weighting / 
% of the 
ESRR* 
Net benefit 
in EUR  
per month 
(2012) 
per month 
(2012) 
Single persons living alone and single 
parents living with underage children 
entitled to maintenance. 
100% 773.26 75% 579.95 
Adult persons, living in a joint household 
with other adult persons (matrimony, 
life partnership, shared flat). 
Each 75% 579.95 Each 56.25% 434.96 
As from the third adult person entitled 
to benefits if this person is entitled to 
maintenance vis-à-vis another person in 
the common household. 
Each 50% 386.63 Each 37.5 & 289.97 
Underage children entitled to family 
benefit: for the eldest three children; 
each 15% (= EUR 116) for additional 
children entitled to family benefit.  
Each 18% 139.19 Each 13.5 % 104.39 
* ESRR= Equalisation supplement reference rate within old-age insurance (=EUR 
773.26 net per month in 2012). 
 
In the 15a treaty, the national government and the federal provinces agreed that 25% 
of the minimum benefit rate may be dedicated to housing costs, where the respective 
amount may not be granted in case that no housing costs apply, or may be cut in case 
of lower housing costs. In other words: In case that no direct housing costs apply, the 
 
 
Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion 
Country Report - Austria 
 
    2012  19 
minimum benefit level, intended to cover the “costs of living” (excluding housing 
costs) only amounts to 75% of the benefit levels given in table 1.  
What has to be stressed is that these benefit levels are minimum benefit levels, and 
that the federal provinces in their respective legislation may define higher ones. 
Furthermore, the 15a treaty as well encloses a clause stipulating that federal 
provinces where benefit levels used to be higher within social assistance (when 
compared to the minimum levels of GMI agreed upon in the 15a treaty) may not 
reduce their benefit levels when replacing social assistance by GMI. 
The Armutskonferenz (2012a) has analysed the GMI legislations of the nine federal 
provinces and the results shows a substantial differentiation concerning benefit levels, 
and as well other points, e.g. how housing benefits are dealt with within GMI or the 
conditions of access for specific groups (e.g. underage persons not living in a common 
household with an adult). 
Table 2 gives an overview on benefit levels, as defined in the respective legislations by 
the federal provinces. Evidently, maximum benefit levels in some cases exceed the 
minimum levels set within the 15a agreement to some degree. This especially applies 
for benefits for children (with the exception of the federal province of Carinthia) and – 
for all groups – in the federal province of Upper Austria, where the clause applies that 
benefit levels of former social assistance may not be cut when replacing social 
assistance by GMI (here, benefit levels of social assistance have been higher than the 
minimum levels agreed for GMI in the 15a treaty). Furthermore, the federal provinces 
handle the question of the 25% of GMI dedicated at housing costs in very different 
ways. In the federal provinces of Vienna and Styria the 25% are granted, even if no 
housing costs apply. Tyrol and Vorarlberg opted for a model where housing costs are 
not covered by the “housing allowance” within GMI (25%), but a specific other 
housing benefit, where housing costs may be covered up to the actual costs. This 
means that the GMI intended to cover “the costs of living” (excluding housing costs) 
here only amounts to 75% of the above mentioned minimum benefit levels (table 1). 
A related situation applies for the remaining federal provinces (Lower Austria, 
Burgenland, Salzburg, Carinthia) where the 25% dedicated at housing costs 
(according to the 15a treaty) are not granted in case that no housing costs apply (or 
are cut in case of lower housing costs). However, to make things even more 
complicated, regulations vary regarding the question if a deduction of the “housing 
allowance” (in case of no housing costs) only applies for adults or as well for underage 
children (see Armutskonferenz 2012a for more details). Given the complicated 
respective regulations, and to avoid misunderstandings, data in table 2 only gives 
maximum benefit rates for the case that housing costs apply (with one exception – 
single adult persons). 
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Table 2:  Minimum benefits from GMI according to the 15a treaty and benefits levels according to GMI legislation (and 
implementing provisions etc.) of the federal provinces; 2012; in % of the “equalisation supplement 
reference rate” (EUR 773.26 net in 2012). 
 
Attributes of person 15a 
treaty 
Vie. L.A. Bgld. Sb. Ty. Vlbg. Sty. Car. U.A. 
Single adult persons, no 
housing costs 
75% 100% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 100% 75% 91% 
Single adult person with 
housing costs 
100% 100% 100% 100%o 100% 75% plus 
specific 
housing 
allowance 
(may sum up 
to more than 
100%) 
75% plus 
specific 
housing 
allowance 
(may sum up 
to more than 
100%) 
100% 100% 109% 
Adult persons, living in a joint 
household with other adult 
persons (matrimony, life 
partnership, shared flat); with 
housing costs 
Each 
75% 
Each 
75% 
Each 
75% 
Each 
75% 
Each 
75% 
Each 56.25% 
plus specific 
housing 
allowance 
(may sum up 
to more than 
75%) 
Each 56.25% 
plus specific 
housing 
allowance 
(may sum up 
to more than 
75%) 
Each 75% Each 
75% 
Each 
76.8% 
Underage children entitled to 
family benefit: for the eldest 
three children; with housing 
costs 
Each 
18% 
Each 
27% 
Each 
23% 
Each 
19.2% 
Each 
21% 
Each 24.75% Each 21.85% 
plus specific 
housing 
allowance 
Each 19% Each 
18% 
Each 
25.1% 
Underage children entitled to 
family benefit: forth eldest 
child and additional children; 
with housing costs 
Each 
15% 
Each 
27% 
Each 
23% 
Each 
19.2% 
Each 
21% 
Each 24.75% Each 21.85% 
plus specific 
housing 
allowance 
Forth eldest 
child: 19%; 
as from the 
fifth eldest 
child: 23% 
Each 
15% 
Each 
23.8% 
Vie. = Vienna; L.A.=Lower Austria; Bgld.=Burgenland; Sb.=Salzburg; Vlbg.=Vorarlberg; Sty.=Styria; Car. = Carinthia; U.A.=Upper Austria 
Source: Armutskonferenz 2012a & own calculations. 
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When assessing the adequacy of the benefit level of GMI, the at-risk-of poverty 
threshold, defined as 60% of the equalised median net income may be taken as a 
reference point. Table three – for three federal provinces - shows the level of 
maximum benefits from GMI plus from family allowances (Familienbeihilfe) and 
compares it to the respective at-risk-of poverty threshold (according to EU-SILC 
2010). 
 
Table 3:  Benefit levels (GMI* plus family allowance) compared to the at-
risk-of poverty threshold. 
 
Composition of 
household 
Benefit level EUR (GMI plus eventual family allowance 
- FA), per month, net 
At-risk-of 
poverty 
threshold; EUR 
per month** 
  Vienna Carinthia Upper Austria   
Single adult 
person 
GMI: 773.26  GMI: 774 GMI: 843.70 1031 
Two adult 
persons in joint 
household 
GMI: 1159.89 GMI: 1161 GMI: 1188.8 1546 
Single parent 
with one child in 
the age of 10 
GMI: 982,04 GMI: 913.32 GMI: 1073.4 
1340 FA: 139.2 FA: 139.2 FA: 139.2 
SUM: 1121.24 SUM: 1052.52 SUM: 1212.6 
Couple with two 
children (in the 
age of 2 and 7) 
GMI: 1577.45 GMI: 1439.64 GMI: 1576,6 
2165 FA: 239.2 FA: 239.2 FA: 239.2 
SUM: 1816.65 SUM: 1678.84 SUM: 1815.8 
* Incl. GMI-benefits dedicated at housing costs. 
** Defined as 60% of the equalised median net income (EU-SILC 2010). 
Source: EU-SILC 2010 (Statistik Austria/BMASK 2011) & own calculations. 
 
These data shows that benefits are in all cases lower than the at-risk-of poverty 
threshold, even when family benefits are taken into account as well.11 This fact has to 
some degree been subject of political and public discussions in Austria, but a possible 
increase of benefit levels has not really been on the agenda.  
What as well should be mentioned is that the GMI in most federal provinces and for 
most groups did not lead to substantially higher benefits, when compared to earlier 
social assistance. In most cases the respective benefits got only increased marginally 
or remained largely at the same level. One exemption is the group of single parents, 
which tend to get significantly higher benefits now (which is a positive development).12 
 
b) No duty to pay back benefits and no obligation for relatives to refund cash benefits 
Within earlier social assistance, former beneficiaries or other persons could get obliged 
to refund social assistance benefits, especially social assistance benefits securing the 
claimant’s subsistence (so-called “Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt”). A former recipient 
                                           
 
11 One could argue that other cash benefits, which may apply additionally under specific circumstances, as 
e.g. long-term care cash benefits or additional housing benefits, should be taken into account as well. 
On the other hand, such benefits are dedicated to cover special costs, whereas a person where such 
costs do not apply (and where for this reason no such benefit is granted) would still be counted as being 
at-risk-of poverty. For this reason, we do not take into account such benefits here.   
12 Within social assistance, in all federal provinces (except of Vienna) single parents only got the lower rate 
for “main recipients”, not the higher rate dedicated at “sole recipients”; see Fink/Grand 2009, 15 for the 
respective reference rates in earlier social assistance. 
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could be obliged to pay back benefits in case of subsequent higher income or 
significantly positive development of disposable property. And as well relatives (here 
the respective regulations varied to a large degree between the federal provinces; see 
Fink/Grand 2009a, 17) could be obliged to refund social assistance benefits according 
to their actual income at the time a relative received social assistance (rising income 
at a later time had not to be taken into account in this case). In Austria, this obligation 
to pay back benefits form the minimum income scheme is called “Regress”.   
Regarding duties of relatives to refund benefits respective rules especially applied for 
parents for underage and as well adult children, and for adult children for their 
parents. With the introduction of the GMI respective rules got modified and 
substantially less rigid. Duties to pay back benefits in case of subsequent higher 
income or significantly positive development of disposable property got abandoned in 
all federal provinces. And Regress duties for parents for adult children and for adult 
children for their parents got abolished in all federal provinces except of Styria and 
Carinthia. The abolition of the duty to pay back benefits and the duty of relatives to 
refund is a positive step. It is likely that the obligation of third parties to refund 
benefits was one reason for the high non-take-up in social assistance (see Fuchs 
2007; 2009). The obligation to refund in most federal provinces could have been 
applied to former beneficiaries up to 10 years after expiration of their entitlement for 
benefits, which is likely to have had a de-motivating effect.13 
 
c) Full integration to health insurance 
Sole recipients of social assistance (i.e. people not in gainful employment or 
simultaneously getting other benefits from social insurance, like e.g. unemployment 
insurance) were not covered by regular health insurance. For them, special “substitute 
insurance vouchers” (Krankenhilfe-Schein) existed, coming along with social 
stigmatization and – in some cases – reportedly with below standard health treatment. 
All benefit recipients (not covered by health insurance otherwise) are now included to 
normal health insurance due to GMI. 
 
d) Assets 
Within social assistance, it was foreseen that assets get capitalized extensively before 
social assistance may be granted. The term “assets” was used comprehensively, 
including e.g. money as well as other moveable and immoveable goods. Within GMI, 
there now applies the rule that savings up to a sum of currently EUR 3,866.3 
(=equalization supplement reference rate x 5) must not be taken into account 
regarding the duty to utilise private assets at first instance. A closer examination 
shows that this rule is interpreted in different ways in the different federal provinces. 
Some apply this amount of exemption to the household and some grant this amount 
of exemption per person in the respective household. One other improvement is that 
private property (owner-occupied flats etc.) may not anymore be “capitalized” via a 
right of lien for the welfare authorities (to be added to the land register) right from the 
beginning of getting benefits from the minimum income scheme, but only after six 
months. Both reform steps may as well contribute to lower non-take-up. 
 
                                           
 
13 However, it is worth noting that former benefits from social assistance were de facto often not subject to 
refunding, even in the case that the income situation of the former recipient improved. According to the 
rule that repayment should not pose a serious economic risk or oppose the general goal of sustainable 
social integration, offices of social administration often abstained from legal action to enforce their 
claims, and e.g. the federal province of Vienna during the recent years did not pursue any cases of 
repayment of whatever type at all. 
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e) Faster processing of applications and written administrative decisions 
Within social assistance, the maximum period for processing of applications (i.e. the 
time in which a decision has to be taken) normally used to be six months. Within the 
15a treaty, the national state and the federal provinces agreed to reduce the 
maximum period to three months. Furthermore, the federal provinces are obliged to 
take measures for an “effective immediate help”. Furthermore, administrative 
decisions (concerning the question if GMI is granted and at what level etc.) have now 
to be issued in written form. The latter should help to improve legal certainty. 
However, the period of appeal is very short in most federal provinces (generally two 
weeks). Only Burgenland and Styria (each four weeks) and Carinthia (six weeks) have 
longer periods of appeal. 
 
f) Integration into ALMP measures and employment oriented personal services 
As already mentioned above (see chapter 2.2), the PES (which is the most important 
provider of ALMP measures) traditionally did often not perceive sole recipients of social 
assistance (i.e. persons who do not simultaneously get transfers from the 
unemployment insurance) to be part of its core-clientele, leading to de-facto reduced 
access to training measures etc. According to the 15a-treaty between the national 
state and the federal provinces recipients of GMI should now have “equal access” to all 
measures offered by the PES. Furthermore, it is planned that the federal provinces 
and municipalities will – in co-operation with the PES – develop additional specific 
ALMP-programmes for recipients of GMI. Such programmes now exist in all federal 
provinces, but many of them are still of the type of pilot-schemes only, eventually to 
be exoanded and modified in the future (see Bergmann et al. 2012).  Overall, it 
appears to be fair to say that the overall political attention given to the question of 
enhancing the employability of benefit recipients of the MI-schemes has increased 
over the last years. However, the actual impact of the related efforts made appears to 
be mixed. A first evaluation by Bergmann et al. (2012) (commissioned by the Federal 
Ministry Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection) shows 
that respective schemes have positive effects on labour market integration and 
employment intensity (see as well BMASK 2012e, 152). However, at the same time it 
is evident that there is still a need to expand the coverage rate of these programmes 
considerably, and more personalised offers should be available for specific target 
groups.14 
 
g) Increased financial incentives to take up or expand employment 
                                           
 
14 Apart of the evaluation of Bergmann et al. (2012) the Minster of Employment, Social Affairs and 
Consumer Protection presented some related data in a recent press release (see: 
http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20120901_OTS0016/hundstorfer-bedarfsorientierte-
mindestsicherung-ist-eine-arbeitsmarktpolitische-erfolgsgeschichte). According to this information about 
92,100 recipients of GMI “got support” by the PES since the introduction of the GMI on 1 September 
2010. 60,528 recipients of the GMI took part in training measures (of which 10,926 persons were sole 
recipients of GMI and 40,602 got GMI as a top-up to benefits from the unemployment insurance). In 
29,157 cases people could be moved into employment, of which 8,561 were sole-recipients of GMI and 
20,596 got GMI as a top-up. This data is largely in line with respective numbers published by the Federal 
Ministry Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection in its recent “Social Report 
2011-2012) (BMASK 2012e, 151), but where no breakdown is given regarding sole recipients vs. people 
with GMI as a top-up taking part in training measures.  It is not possible to calculate success rates of 
transfers into employment from these data, as at the time of writing no exact data are available on the 
total number of people receiving GMI since its introduction. We only know that 193.276 persons received 
GMI in 2011, of which approx. 26% were under-age persons (see:  
http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/soziales/sozialleistungen_auf_landesebene/bedarfsorientierte
_mindestsicherung/index.htm for respective data). 
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Within earlier social assistance, income from gainful employment led to a cutback of 
social assistance on a pro-rata basis (with some minor exemptions; see Fink/Grand 
2009a, 18). This principle largely remains to be in place within GMI. In other words: 
almost every kind of additional income in case of GMI is subject to a “marginal tax 
rate“ of 100%, as the GMI does not offer any model of stepwise tapering off of 
benefits. Here, only one minor exception applies. 15% of earned income are not 
deducted from the GMI benefit in case that a person has been unemployed and 
receiving GMI for at least 6 months or if he/she takes up a job for the first time. This 
amount of exemption is granted for a period of 18 months, and it amounts to a 
minimum of 7% (EUR 54 per month) and a maximum of 17% (EUR 131.5 per month) 
of the equalisation supplement reference rate for singles. Given this rather low levels 
of the amount of exemption, the additional incentive of this measure to take up a job 
appears to be rather limited. Furthermore, it does not address the rather large group 
of people getting benefits from GMI as a top-up to low income from gainful 
employment.  
When compared to the MI-schemes, reforms within the area of unemployment 
insurance have been rather marginal over the last 4 years. What is worth mentioning 
here is that benefits in unemployment assistance got increased to some degree in 
case of low benefit levels. Unemployment assistance is granted to persons who were 
eligible for unemployment benefit, but where the right for unemployment benefit has 
expired due to reaching the respective maximum periods. It is means-tested against 
other earned income within the household (but not against assets). The usual rate of 
unemployment assistance amounts to 92% of the previous “basic amount” of 
unemployment benefit. Before the reform, it applied that the level of unemployment 
assistance got increased to 95% of the previous “basic amount” of unemployment 
benefit in case that the benefit level in unemployment assistance lied below the 
threshold of the equalisation supplement reference rate (see as well Fink/Grand 
2009a). Now, not only the basic amount of unemployment benefits is taken into 
account when calculating unemployment assistance, but as well supplements granted 
within the scheme of unemployment benefits. The “basic amount” of unemployment 
benefits equals 55% of the net average wages during the last year or the year before 
last. Low unemployment benefits may then, however, be extended to the level of the 
equalisation supplement reference rate (currently EUR 814.82 per month), but may 
not exceed a net replacement rate of 60% for individual benefit claimants or 80% for 
people responsible for child maintenance, who are at the same time eligible for family 
supplements of EUR 0.97 per day for every dependent family member. These 
“increased” benefit level are now as well applied for the calculation of unemployment 
assistance, which now amounts to 95% of the previous “increased” level of 
unemployment benefit (in case that the benefit is lower than level of the equalisation 
supplement reference rate).  
One second measure decided was that within unemployment assistance deductions 
due to other income of the household (i.e. income of partners) may not lead to an 
overall household income which is below the above mentioned reference rates for GMI 
(incl. the 25% for housing costs), as agreed upon within the 15a treaty (see above 
table 1). 
These two measures were decided within the reform package of the GMI, following the 
aim to reduce the need for co-payments from the MI schemes to some degree. 
However, the respective effect appears to be rather limited, as still no minimum 
benefit exists in the Austrian system of unemployment insurance. 
3.1.2 The impact of income support and major challenges 
Table 4 and table 5 show – for different types of households - the impact of different 
systems of social transfers on at-risk-of poverty rates. These data address the 
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situation before the GMI got introduced and therefore do not give any information 
about the impact of the above mentioned reforms. Yet, what gets evident is that the 
impact of the earlier minimum income scheme (social assistance) appeared to be 
rather limited: without social assistance the overall at-risk-of poverty rate would have 
only increased by one percentage point. Cash benefits from the unemployment 
insurance appear to be somewhat more important (showing an overall impact of three 
percentage points). Apart of old-age pensions, family benefits are evidently the most 
important cash transfers in reducing the at-risk-of poverty rate, with an overall impact 
of seven percentage points (and a much higher one in the case of families with 
children). The rather limited overall impact of unemployment benefits can be 
explained by the fact that the unemployment rate is comparatively low in Austria – in 
2011 it amounted to 4.2%.15 When looking specifically at households where at least 
one member is unemployed, without unemployment benefits the at-risk-of poverty 
rate would rise from 12% to 21% in case of “short-term” unemployment (with a 
duration  six months) and from 29% to 42% in case of long-term unemployment 
(with a duration ≥ 12 months). At the same time the effect of the MI-schemes again 
appears to be very limited, with an impact of one to two percentage points only. The 
latter is unlikely to have changed with the introduction of the GMI due to the fact that 
benefit levels – as described above – remain to be lower than the at-risk-of poverty 
threshold.  
What should however been taken in mind is the fact that the MI-scheme may on the 
one hand have a limited effect on poverty rates, but that it on the other hand is likely 
to reduce the depth of poverty considerably. Unfortunately no published data are 
available on the effect of different social transfers on the poverty gap, which would 
display the respective effects. 
                                           
 
15 Source: Eurostat database, [lfsa_urgan]. 
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Table 4: At-risk-of poverty rates before and after social transfers according to household composition (2009/2010) 
Type of household Number of 
persons in 
1,000 
At-risk-of poverty rate 
After 
pensions and 
other social 
transfers 
before… 
Pensions and 
other social 
transfers 
Old-age 
pensions and 
surviving 
dependants' 
pensions 
Other social 
transfers 
(except of 
pensions) 
Family benefits 
and cash 
benefits in 
context of 
education 
Benefits from 
unemployment 
insurance 
Cash benefits 
within the 
health system 
Social assistance 
and housing 
benefits 
in % 
Total 8,283 12 43 36 24 19 15 14 13 
Households with pension benefits 1,695 15 96 100 18 15 16 15 16 
Single men 136 13 98 100 15 13 14 13 13 
Single women  419 26 99 100 29 26 26 27 28 
Multi-person household 1,141 11 95 100 14 11 12 11 11 
          
Households without pension benefits 6,588 11 29 19 26 20 14 14 12 
Single men 416 19 29 20 29 20 24 23 20 
Single women 334 24 33 25 30 25 26 26 25 
Multi-person household without children 1,925 6 20 23 14 7 8 10 6 
Household with children 3,913 12 33 17 31 26 15 13 13 
Single-parents households 292 28 53 29 50 42 33 30 31 
Multi-person household with 1 child 1,441 7 20 13 17 12 9 9 8 
Multi-person household with 2 children 1,470 11 32 15 30 26 14 11 11 
Multi-person household with 3+ children 710 18 53 22 53 49 24 19 21 
          
Households with youngest child in the age…           
up to 3 years 1,164 15 46 19 44 41 19 15 16 
4 to 6 years 546 13 38 16 36 30 18 14 15 
older than 6 years 2,280 10 28 19 23 18 13 12 11 
Source: EU-SILC 2010; Statistik Austria/BMASK (2012, 147). 
 
Table 5: At-risk-of poverty rates before and after social transfers for selected risk groups (2009/2010) 
Type of household 
Number of 
persons in 
1,000 
At-risk-of poverty rate 
After pensions 
and other 
social 
transfers 
before… 
Pensions and 
other social 
transfers 
Old-age 
pensions and 
surviving 
dependants' 
pensions 
Other social 
transfers 
(except of 
pensions) 
Family 
benefits and 
cash benefits 
in context of 
education 
Benefits from 
unemployment 
insurance 
Cash benefits 
within the 
health system 
Social 
assistance and 
housing 
bnefits 
in % 
Total 8,283 12 43 36 24 19 15 14 13 
Households with…   
        Disability (in working-age) 744 13 57 41 41 23 19 23 15
Unemployment   
            Short-term  6 months 1,038 12 44 21 39 27 21 13 13
    Long-term ≥ 12 months 681 29 66 42 57 45 42 31 31 
Member with citizenship other than EU/EFTA 904 30 61 37 59 53 37 32 32 
Naturalized citizen 302 24 54 33 46 37 32 26 27 
Source: EU-SILC 2010; Statistik Austria/BMASK (2012, 150). 
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One other point where information is very limited is the question of non-take-up. 
Whereas the coverage of unemployment insurance remains to be rather high (in 2011 
93.8% of unemployed men and 86.2% of all unemployed women registered with the 
PES received a benefit from unemployment insurance16), no up-to-date detailed data 
are currently available regarding GMI. Concerning earlier social assistance, it has been 
estimated that non-take up amounted to ca. 50 to 55% (see Fuchs 2007, 28; 2009, 
296). Although no detailed data got published until now regarding the development of 
recipients of GMI (they are expected to be made public in the second half of 2012) 
preliminary data point to the direction of a considerable increase. According to 
information provided by the Federal Ministry for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Consumer protection (BMASK), about 138,000 persons received GMI in December 
2011. When compared to the number of recipients of social assistance in December 
2008 (i.e. at the beginning of the financial and economic crisis), this equals an 
increase of 37% (BMASK 2012a, 7). The BMASK – however not providing a more 
detailed assessment - comes to the conclusion that this increase is likely to be caused 
by rising indigence, but as well by a reduction of the non-take-up rate which occurred 
when replacing social assistance by GMI.17 
Regarding the question of attempts to increase labour market participation of people 
relying on social transfers, it appears to be fair to say that transfers from 
unemployment insurance (i.e. both unemployment benefit and unemployment 
assistance) and GMI are sufficiently linked to activation. Both recipients of benefits 
from unemployment insurance and from GMI are obliged to take part in ALMP-
measures, and different sanctions apply if they refuse to do so. Concerning the 
availability of ALMP-measures, it is true that Austria has not been a forerunner in the 
area of active labour market policies, but the respective situation changed to a large 
degree over the last two decades (Grand 2009; Atzmüller 2009; BMASK 2011a). 
Spending for active labour market policies is now well above average of EU-27 and the 
overall rate of participation in education and training is comparatively high (see Fink 
2012b for respective data). Spending for active labour market policies got 
considerably increased during the crisis: from EUR 1.06 billion in 2008 to EUR 1.310 
billion in 2009 and then further to EUR 1.324 billion in 2010.18 Together with 
spending, as well the number of people taking part in respective measures increased 
considerably. Table 6 presents respective data for the months January to February for 
the years 2008 to 2012 (for yearly data see table 7 below). 
 
Table 6: Number of persons in ALMP-measures by the PES 
 Jan. - 
Feb. 
2012 
Jan. - 
Feb. 
2011 
Jan. - 
Feb. 
2010 
Jan. - 
Feb. 
2009 
Jan. - 
Feb. 
2008 
Employment promotion (excl. short-time 
work) 
22,036 22,606 26,057 17,254 20,409 
Qualification 128,890 132,794 157,024 131,500 136,087 
Support 40,139 36,555 34,611 28,440 31,264 
All measures (excl. Short-time work) 172,044 174,936 200,407 164,461 173,127 
Source: AMS-DWH; BMASK (2012b). 
 
                                           
 
16 Source: AMS (2012, 35) 
17 Furthermore, data cleansing done when replacing social assistance by GMI may have played a role as 
well. 
18 These data include respective spending by the Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs and Consumer 
Protection. Respective numbers are therefore higher than the ones presented in table 8 below, which 
only cover spending by the Public Employment Service (PES). 
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As from 2011 the number of persons in ALMP-measures decreased again, as did the 
spending for ALMP-measures (to EUR 1.177 billion in 2011). This development took 
place on the background of reduced unemployment rates, coming down from 4.9% in 
2009 to 4.2% in 2011.19 
Overall, ALMP-measures appear to be rather effective, as the long-term 
unemployment rate is rather low in Austria from an international comparative 
perspective (which is, however, as well caused by the rather positive overall 
performance of the Austrian labour market): in 2011, long-term unemployment 
(lasting one year or longer) amounted to 25.9% of total unemployment in Austria (EU-
27 average: 42.9%).20  
Within national data sources, besides of data on “long-term unemployment”, there is 
as well data available on so-called “long-term inoccupation” 
(Langzeitbeschäftigungslosigkeit) (see BMASK 2012c for this concept and respective 
data). Within this concept, short term breaks of unemployment (by gainful 
employment or education measures) are not taken into account and respective figures 
show that there is a considerable stock of registered unemployed where enduring 
integration into the first labour market is not reached. In 2011, the number of 
respective people amounted to approx. 75,000 persons, whereas the stock of all 
registered unemployed was ca. 250,000 at yearly average. This means that ca. 30% 
of all registered unemployed are affected by “long-term inoccupation” (no stable 
integration into the first labour market within 365 days). During the last years (i.e. 
even before the economic and financial crisis) the number of people facing long-term 
inoccupation never was lower than ca. 50,000, which indicates lasting problems of 
labour market integration for specific groups of the unemployed even in times of 
rather favourable macroeconomic performance. This problem does not appear to be 
caused by too generous social transfers, as respective wage replacement rates are not 
extraordinarily high from an international comparative point of view (see Annex chart 
1). It more appears that these people – apart from qualification deficits - often face 
multiple personal problems, reducing their competitive capacities on the labour 
market. 
3.2 Inclusive labour markets 
Under the heading of “inclusive labour markets” the EC in its’ recommendation of 
3.10.2008 on the “active inclusion of people excluded from the labour market” at first 
instance addresses two major points: 
a) Measures in the areas education, ALMP and personalised services, in order to 
increase capabilities to find a job and to stay in employment. 
b) Measures to promote quality jobs and to prevent labour market segmentation, 
in particular with a view to preventing in-work poverty. 
 
Furthermore, the question of work incentives gets mentioned (not only regarding to 
benefits but as well concerning the tax system), and it gets stressed that support 
should be provided for the social economy and sheltered employment.  
 
Ad a) 
As already mentioned above, it is fair to say that Austria – after a respective upgrade 
during the last two decades – nowadays shows a rather well established and 
                                           
 
19 Source: Eurostat database, [lfsa_urgan]. 
20 Source: Eurostat database; [lfsa_upgal]. 
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differentiated system of ALMP-measures. Measures by the PES can be grouped 
according to three main types (see as well table 6 and table 7 below for numbers of 
ALMP-participants according to the three types).  
 
Table 7: Persons covered by fundings and aid by the PES for ALMP-measures; 
2008-2011 
  Number of persons1 
 Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 
     
All funding and aids 357,152 459,623 438,365 377,869 
          
of which "employment" 62,380 125,606 92,769 65,921 
of which         
company integration subsidies  31,101 32,499 41,703 29,433 
short-term work subsidies 8,232 66,965 23,706 3,822 
socio-economic enterprises and non-profit   
employment projects 
21,686 23,858 27,326 26,929 
          
of which „qualification“ 290,312 336,355 345,424 310,049 
of which          
labour foundations 13,907 19,782 20,245 14,306 
qualification measures 144,245 178,732 201,603 179,539 
course costs 42,810 53,178 45,826 41,719 
apprenticeship subsidies 20,896 31,708 21,442 13,505 
qualification for employed persons 41,789 49,134 48,545 48,890 
supplementary aid for covering living costs 187,948 231,328 253,835 224,690 
          
of which „support“ 76,081 85,885 92,769 91,303 
of which         
consulting and support institutions 53,663 63,533 70,660 69,805 
start-up aid and business start-up programmes 7,976 8,472 9,269 8,110 
1 Number of persons according to „decisive“ calculation. According to this method, a 
person is counted in all categories of measures that apply for him/her, but only one 
time when summing up the different categories of measures. Source: BMASK (2012d) 
and BMASK (2010b).   
 
 
Table 8: Spending by the PES for ALMP-measures; 2008-2011 
  Spending by the PES for ALMP-measures 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 
  in Mio EUR in % in Mio EUR in % in Mio EUR in % in Mio EUR in % 
"Employment" 195.96 22.21 336.35 30.04 306.48 28.41 221.19 22.69 
of which short-time work 1.01 0.11 113.52 10.14 54.87 5.09 6.09 0.62 
"Qualification" 611.83 69.35 699.86 62.51 686.98 63.67 666.72 68.40 
"Support" 74.45 8.44 83.3 7.44 85.5 7.92 86.79 8.90 
Total 882.24 100.00 1119.51 100.00 1078.96 100.00 974.7 100.00 
Source: AMS (2011) and AMS (2012). 
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First, respective measures by the PES include programmes for qualification - for 
unemployed as well as for people in active employment. This is the most important 
strategy within the measures provided by PES. In 2011 a total of EUR 666.72 were 
used for qualification schemes, representing 68.4% of all subsidy outlays by the PES. 
Overall, in 2011 about 310,000 persons took part in qualification measures organised 
by the PES or got respective subsidies, whereas the respective number was ca. 
345,000 in 2010 (see table 7 above). 
So called “employment promotion” is a second group of measures. This includes 
amongst others so called company integration subsidies (wage subsidies for employers 
employing former long-term unemployed), short-term work benefits and employment 
projects, e.g. within so-called “social economic companies” (Sozialökonomische 
Betriebe; SÖBs). The latter offers opportunities for social stabilization and 
individualised training for people with special needs, who are supposed to be in need 
of special offers before they can be re-integrated to the first labour market. Overall, 
221.19 million EUR were spent for “employment promotion” in 2011 . This 
corresponds to 22.69% of the subsidies budget of 2011. From a mid-term perspective, 
the share of employment promotion in all spending of the PES has been rising to some 
degree, but then got reduced again. The reduction between 2009 and 2010 is caused 
by the fact that the number of people receiving short-term work benefits decreased 
considerably (from 66,965 to 23,706) due to the improving economic and labour 
market situation. Between 2010 and 2011 especially the number of people within the 
programme of company integration subsidies got reduced. 
A third group of measures is termed “support”. This contains a rather broad range of 
measures. Examples are consulting for people with particular problem situations, 
debts advice for example. Further support programmes include the company-founding 
programme (for unemployed who decide to get self-employed) or ESF qualification 
consulting and flexibility consulting for businesses. In 2011 a total of EUR 86.79 
million were invested into measures of this type, representing around 8.9% of all 
subsidy expenses. Support subsidies were approved for around 91,000 persons in 
2011. 
The question is, of course, if and to what degree these measures by the PES reach the 
most vulnerable. Information on this question is rather limited. One – however older 
and for that reason not covering the recent years - assessment by Grand (2009) 
shows that people with very low qualification (this means with primary education only) 
are – even when compared to their share in the unemployed - overrepresented within 
qualification measures provided by the PES (by about 30%). When it comes to funds, 
there is again no evidence pointing to the direction that the very low qualified would 
have access to cheaper measures only (funds for this group exceed the level that 
would be expected according to their integration to qualification schemes). However, 
people having an apprenticeship examination as the highest formal qualification (and 
not any other higher qualification from the general education system), are to 
considerable degree underrepresented in measures by the PES (by about 40%) and 
costs of the measures they are taking part are by 20% lower than would be expected 
(according to the level that they are integrated into respective schemes). For this, 
Grand (2009) concludes that – according to these data – on the one hand no 
systematic approach to focus on people with low or very low qualification exists. On 
the other hand, one may argue that these people are at least not evidently 
discriminated within the respective schemes, as they do as well have access to rather 
costly measures, and are not palmed off with cheap measures only.  
Furthermore, it should be stressed that several measures within the portfolio of PES 
are targeted to specific groups. Apart others, these are especially young unemployed 
and women. Regarding young people, one very important instrument is the so-called 
“apprenticeship guarantee”, introduced in 2008. Hereby, additional apprenticeships 
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are provided at special training institutions to those young people who have not been 
successful with finding an apprenticeship or job at private companies. In December 
2011 10,467 persons took part in the scheme and in 2011/2012 about 12,300 places 
are available. The overall costs of this measure amount to EUR 187 million per year. 
This scheme evidently has positive impacts regarding social inclusion and labour 
market segmentation, as it helps to prevent young people from completely losing 
contact to the labour market and measures of further qualification.  
Measures for specific target groups are not only offered by the PES, but as well by 
Federal Social Office (Bundessozialamt) and its’ regional branches, partly implemented 
in co-operation with the regional offices of the PES and other regional stakeholders 
(organised in so-called territorial employment pacts, TEPS, and partly co-financed via 
ESF). Within these schemes, which as well include job retention and advancement, 
special measures are offered to disabled people. The client groups are at first instance 
people with mental or psychosocial disorders, the deaf and those with a hearing 
impairment of over 50 percent, mentally, physically or multiply disabled persons, and 
the blind and those with visual impairments. Respective measures were initially 
restricted to adults, but then (as from 2001) expanded to disabled young people. 
Schemes offered include youth coaching/clearing, so-called ”professional training 
assistance” (Berufsausbildungsassistenz), subsidies to improve accessibly for people 
with impairments in companies, wage subsidies, ”personal assistance at the 
workplace” as well as ”work assistance” (Arbeitsassistenz). Within work assistance, 
which is the best known measure offered by the Federal Social Offices, clients are 
looked after by a by a so-called job support assistant, who helps them to organise 
their personal life, to find a suitable job and to stay in the job. Work assistance can 
take several months or even longer, but the main aim here is to enable the client to 
be independent as soon as possible. Within the schemes of the Federal Social Office 
about 12,680 persons were covered by work assistance in 2011. The respective 
number has been rising over the recent years, e.g. in 2007 in amounted to 9,277 and 
in 2003 to 6,457 (Bundessozialamt 2012).  
During the recent years, the Federal Social Office as well especially expanded activities 
targeted at young people.21 Within professional training assistance, young apprentices 
with special needs get “accompanied” by a support assistant during the whole 
apprenticeship. If a normal apprenticeship is not possible, then other options of 
“partial qualification” (Teilqualifizierung) may be pursued. In 2011, 5,318 persons 
were covered by this scheme. Respective numbers have as well increased during 
recent years – they nearly doubled since 2007 (2,736 cases). One other measure 
especially targeted at vulnerable young people is a new Youth Coaching Programme 
(Jugendcoaching), which – in a first step – will be implemented in Vienna as from the 
school year 2012/2013, but which is planned to be then expanded to the other federal 
provinces. Within this programme, pupils get special support and guidance already 
during the last school year and may then be “accompanied” by special coaches during 
further education or when entering the labour market (up to the age of 19, or 25 in 
case of a disability). The target group is planned to be about 8,200 young persons in 
Vienna and 6,600 in Styria. 
One other measure organised by the Federal Social Offices is a new programme called 
fit2work. It got introduced in Styria, Vienna and lower Austria in 2011 and is planned 
to be expanded to the other federal provinces until 2013. This programme offers 
services for people at risk of losing their jobs due to health problems, or who have 
already lost their jobs for health reasons. Furthermore, it is planned that it should 
                                           
 
21 Concerning this target group, see as well chapter 2.1 above concerning the reform in school education, 
transferring lower secondary schools (Hauptschulen) into the model of the New Secondary Schools 
(Neue Mittelschulen). 
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improve health prevention within working live. It offers advice, support and 
counselling both for employers and (former) jobholders. This programme got 
introduced on the background of high inflow into invalidity pensions in Austria (see 
e.g. Fink 2012b). It is estimated that the programme will, when in place in all federal 
provinces as from 2013, will address 19,500 individuals per year and that 500 
companies will get counselling etc. The total yearly costs are estimated to be EUR 27.5 
million (see Opperschall 2012 for more details). 
Overall – and especially from an international comparative point of view – Austria 
shows a rather dense net of measures for active inclusion designated at vulnerable 
people. Furthermore, respective measures got expanded during recent years. One 
group that traditionally appeared to fall between the cracks - namely people in social 
assistance with special need for support, but who are at the same time not “disabled” 
according to the criteria used within the schemes of the Federal Social Office – are 
now, according to the 15a treaty on the GMI, as well planned to be integrated into 
respective measures (both in terms of standard measures offered by the PES and as 
well specific targeted measures organised by the federal provinces in co-operation 
with the PES). However, now more detailed information is available regarding the 
actual impact of the latter, as respective evaluations will only be presented by the end 
of 2012.  
At the same time it should be stressed that there exists a considerable number of 
people who do not manage to achieve stable employment, irrespective of all the 
ALMP-measures etc. available. As described above, this applies for ca. 50,000 persons 
within the group registered with the PES (the ones affected by so-called “long-term 
inoccupation” – Langzeitbeschäftigungslosigkeit). The actual number is likely to be 
considerably higher, as not all unemployed and/or currently economically “inactive” 
people trying to get a job are registered with the PES. However, no valid evidence is 
available concerning the question how large this group is. 
 
Ad b) 
Concerning the question of quality jobs, it is fair to say that the overall in-work-
poverty rate is not high in Austria from an international comparative point of view. In 
2010, about 4.9% of all employed persons where affected by being at-risk-of poverty 
and the respective numbers recently have been decreasing (2008: 6.4%; 2009: 
5.9%). At average of EU-27, the in-work-at-risk of poverty rate is much higher, 
amounting to 8.5% in 2010. However, in-work-poverty as well in the Austrian case 
implies a challenge, as the absolute number of people affected is rather high when 
compared to other groups in working age affected by being at-risk-of poverty. The 
overall number of working poor amounted to 206,000 in 2010, whereas the number of 
unemployed (6 months or over in the previous year) with an income below the at-risk-
of poverty threshold was 155,000. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the 
reduction of the at-risk-of poverty rate between 2008 and 2009 lies within the 
statistical fluctuation range. The reduction between 2009 and 2010 is at first instance 
caused by the fact that people affected by in-work-poverty had a much higher risk of 
getting unemployed than other jobholders during the peak-year of the economic and 
financial crisis (i.e. 2009, which is actually the empirical basis for income date in EU-
SILC 2010): According to Statistics Austria/BMASK (2011, 47f.), the risk of getting 
unemployed for working poor was four times higher in 2009 than for other jobholders 
and the reduction in the number of working poor was caused by the fact that 
respective persons moved to unemployment.  
In this context it has to be mentioned that – unfortunately – no new and up-do-date 
data is currently available on the development of the structure of earnings. The most 
recent results available derive from the Structure of Earnings Survey of 2006, showing 
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a rather high concentration of low-wage employment in specific branches, like tourism 
and trade, and that low-wage employment is a much more common phenomenon for 
women (24.2%) than for men (5.1%) (see Geisberger/Knittler 2010). Overall, 
according to these data, the share of people affected by low-wage employment is only 
slightly lower in Austria (14.5%) than at average of EU-27 (17.59%) (see Annex Chart 
2). 
Regarding labour market segmentation and segregation, it is worrying that Austria, 
together with the Czech Republic, shows the highest gender pay gap of all EU-member 
states. In 2010, the unadjusted gender pay gap in industry, construction and services 
(except public administration, defence, compulsory social security), amounted to 
25.5% (EU-27: 16.4%) (see Annex Chart 3). This number has not been showing much 
change over time during recent years. One other point is the very high concentration 
of part-time employment on women. The part-time rate of women (2011: 43.4%) is 
5.6 times higher than the part-time rate of men (2011: 7.8%). In the EU, only in 
Luxembourg the concentration of part-time employment exceeds the one in Austria 
(see Annex Chart 4). In Austria, the respective gap between men and women got to 
some degree reduced between 2004 and 2009, but is largely constant since then. 
These data point to the direction, that the question of how to improve the quality of 
jobs or how to promote more equality of chances and risks on the labour market 
should be a political topic in Austria. However, respective questions do not tend to get 
addressed by the most important political players in an encompassing way, but only 
according to a rather narrow way of problem interpretation and setting respective 
measures very selectively. 
Hereby, it has to be stressed that the formal coverage rate of collective agreements is 
very high in Austria (reportedly up to 99% in the private sector). So it should be 
expected that the differentiation of working conditions gets mitigated to a large 
degree. However, it is fair to say that Austria does not show a strong tradition of 
“solidaristic” wage policies. Hermann and Flecker (2009, 23) conclude that the 
Austrian economic system, when looking at wage differentials, rather shows features 
of an “Anglo-American” type of governance than a continental European one. This is – 
apart from others – caused by the fact that for a long time the trade unions, 
irrespectively of their official statements signalling that they avow for “solidaristic” 
wage policies, in fact implemented a sectorial approach, whereby minimum wages 
were often set at a very low level. The goal was – according to the then dominant 
interpretation – to protect jobs with lower productivity from being removed (especially 
at small and medium sized enterprises and in sectors with lower overall productivity) 
(see Hermann 2009). Furthermore, the topic of equal opportunities for women was for 
a long time not on the top of the agenda of public politics. Here, the dominant model 
was for a long time that of “a male-breadwinner-family”, suggesting that male 
employment is the rule and female employment – at best – a possibility. This led to 
the situation that segregation was always rather high, with a tendency that (native) 
men occupied the more favourable positions on the labour market, leaving the less 
favourable ones for women and immigrants (see e.g. Mairhuber 2009; Leitner 2003). 
Krenn (2010) writes that “the trade union side [now] seems to be more active in 
addressing the problems related to low wages and poverty risks – although the term 
‘working poor’ itself does not play an important role in the trade unions’ policy. 
Instead, the problems of ‘in work poverty’ and insufficient wages are addressed as 
part of the broader issues of atypical employment and its social risks.” Regarding 
employer’s organisations, he comes to the conclusion that it is “difficult to determine 
[their] attitudes, because it is hard to find comments from their side” (ibid). In fact, 
for a long time they refused the introduction of a national minimum wage, arguing 
that this would be “counterproductive”, as it would lead to higher unemployment 
within the group of people with low qualifications. Instead, they repeatedly asked for a 
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model of public wage subsidies, making it easier to make “an offer of proper jobs” also 
in the sector of low-qualified employment. 
Within the reform package of the GMI (see above chapter 3.1), it was agreed between 
the national government and the national-level social partner organisations (already in 
July 2007), that a minimum pay rate of EUR 1,000 gross for full-time employment 
should be implemented in all sectorial collective agreements by 1 January 2009 at the 
latest. Hereby, the dominating rationale was not so much about the sui generis 
problem of low wages, but about problems with work incentives that might occur when 
benefits from the MI-scheme get increased to some degree (which, however, de facto 
only took place to minor degree22 and in some federal provinces only). This minimum 
wage evidently improved the situation of some employees in those branches paying 
the lowest wages. However, according to estimations, only for 30.000 to 50.000 wage 
earners in Austria this new minimum threshold came along with a direct effect, as 
many collective agreements stipulated minimum wages above or just below this level 
when it was introduced. In this context it is worth mentioning that the trade unions 
had started to claim for a minimum wage of EUR 1,000 as early as 2003, but did not 
adjust this claim to the development of prices or wages over the years. In 2010, they 
started a new campaign for a minimum wage of EUR 1.300 gross per month, but it is 
rather unlikely that they will succeed with this in the near future. 
The national government has put the question of working conditions and wage 
differentials on its’ agenda in a rather narrowly defined way. If respective questions 
get addressed upon at all, then at first instance regarding equal employment 
opportunities for women. Regarding concrete measures, most of them are of the type 
of “soft governance” only. Examples are information campaigns, company reports on 
their wages, the new rule that vacancy notices must now as well contain information 
about the wage that may be expected or a new online wage calculator23 (introduced in 
2011). The latter tool should provide information and give the users an idea how their 
wage corresponds to the average real wage in their profession under related 
circumstances (i.e. earlier work experience etc.). These measures are positive steps, 
but they are likely to show an impact in the long run only and it is questionable if they 
are sufficient to deal with the evident structural problems. 
Concerning the other points addressed by the EC under the heading of “inclusive 
labour markets” only gradual changes occurred over the last years.  
The tax wedge on the labour cost, measuring the relative tax burden for an employed 
person with low earnings, is – according to Eurostat – 39.6 % in the EU-average (EU-
25) and 43.7 % in Austria. Experts refer to this relatively high tax burden on labour 
since several years and recommend a relief of the labour factor. Over the last years, 
reform on this point was limited. The only exception is the income-tax reform of 2009. 
Hereby, from a social inclusion perspective, the most important measure was the 
raising of the tax exemption limit (”Steuerfreigrenze”) from EUR 10,000 per year to 
EUR 11,000 per year. On the whole, Statistics Austria expects that the tay reform of 
2009 implies a mean tax release of EUR 329 per year for each of the 6.1 million 
employed persons or pensioners. However, about 2.6 million persons, 1.7 million of 
whom females, do not benefit from the tariff reform because they did not have to pay 
any wage tax even under the old legislation (where tax exemption limit was EUR 
10,000). Here, it is important to notice that the high tax wedge in Austria for low 
income earners at first instance derives from high contributions to social insurance, 
and not so much from income taxes. One positive measure worth mentioning in this 
                                           
 
22 Especially as it got finally decided to grant GMI only 12 times per year instead of 14 times per year; see 
above chapter 3.1. 
23 See www.gehaltsrechner.gv.at 
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context (however with a rather limited impact only) is that - since 2008 – low income 
earners are partly exempted from paying unemployment insurance contributions. 
In Austria sheltered employment is inter alia organised via a quota system 
programme. According to this quota system companies would – in principle – be 
obliged to offer one job of sheltered employment (for a disabled person) per 25 job-
holders in the company. But only about 23% of all employers fulfil this obligation in 
full (Bundessozialamt 2011, 11), whereas the others (including those who fulfil it only 
partially) opt for paying a so-called “compensation tax” instead, which (since the 
respective reform in 2011) amounts to a sum between 226 and 336 EUR per year 
(depending on the size of the company) and per place of sheltered employment that 
would have had to be offered. Before, the compensation tax amounted to 223 EUR 
(irrespective of the size of the company). The gathered levies are used for purposes of 
vocational integration only. For people in sheltered employment a special dismissal 
protection applies. Before the reform, this special dismissal protection applied already 
after 6 months of employment within a company. With the reform of 2011, it got 
decided that four years of employment are now the precondition of the special 
dismissal protection. Hereby, it was argued that the earlier regulation restrained many 
employers from offering sheltered employment. If and to what degree this reform led 
to an improvement of the respective situation is unclear at the time of writing, as 
respective data for 2011/2012 has not yet been published. 
No structural measures have been taken over the last years to improve employment 
opportunities in the sector of social economy. Respective organisations often face 
financing problems and what is especially missing is mid- or long-term financial 
predictability. This – inter alia – contributes to a situation where long-term 
employment opportunities for people with reduced working capacities are rare in this 
sector. In other words: No real “third” labour market exists in the case of Austria, 
offering long-term jobs for people who structurally lack competitiveness under market 
conditions. Furthermore, the social economy itself is increasingly subject to a process 
of marketization, leading to a growing incidence of precarious employment within this 
sector (see e.g. Dimmel 2012). 
3.3 Access to quality services 
Services essential to supporting active social and economic inclusion policies are social 
assistance services, employment and training services, housing support and social 
housing, childcare, long-term care services and health services. Social assistance 
services and employment services have already been addressed in the chapters 3.1 
and 3.2 above, so the following section will concentrate on the remaining areas of 
social services. 
 
Housing support and social housing 
No major structural changes appeared in the area of social housing and housing 
support over the last years. This means that a situation got prolonged, for which the 
following features are typical (see as well Fink/Grand 2009b; Perl 2008): a) “Social 
housing” by the municipalities and dwellings offered by “Limited Profit Housing 
Associations” (LPHAs) contribute to a rather large share of total housing (in sum about 
20%). These housing opportunities are not only available for people and families with 
very low income, but as well for the middle classes, which comes along with a rather 
broad compound of people with different social backgrounds living in respective 
dwellings. However, quite substantive accession costs are in place for such dwellings 
(especially regarding LPHAs), which may lead to a partial exclusion of people with low 
income. b) The highest grade facilities and services for the homeless are available in 
the big cities, whereas in many Länder the rural areas are not well covered. The 
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Länder of Vienna, Upper Austria, Vorarlberg and to some degree also Lower Austria 
have established a more integrated approach for planning and implementing facilities 
and services for the homeless (also in rural areas), whereas in most of the other 
federal provinces selective or isolated measures (especially concentrated on urban 
areas) are predominant. As much as no vertical co-ordination exists in the area of 
housing services and social services for the homeless (see Fink/Grand 2009b). Here 
the national government appears to take the position that this is not a national issue 
at all, but one solely to be dealt with by the federal provinces and the municipalities. 
 
Childcare 
Evidently, deficits regarding childcare facilities for children in pre-school age (and here 
especially in the age below 4 years and regarding full-time care) are a long-standing 
problem in Austria (see e.g. Fink 2011b; Annex chart 5 to 7). Hereby, it should be 
mentioned that the competency for child-care facilities for children at pre-school is one 
of the federal provinces at first instance. This led to a situation where the accessibility 
of such services varies to a very large degree when comparing the nine federal 
provinces to each other. The situation has to some degree improved during the last 
two decades (see Annex table 1), but irrespective of the rising share of children in 
institutional childcare deficits are still evident. The latter, inter alia, especially is true 
regarding full-time care, flexibility of opening hours or childcare during school 
holidays. The national state has repeatedly tried to improve the respective situation 
via special grants made available to the federal provinces in case that they expand 
childcare facilities. However, respective grants, amounting to EUR 15 million per year, 
got suspended for the year of 2011 (decided in December 2010). In Mai 2011 a 
debate started about the question of a re-introduction of these special grants even 
before the year of 2012. The background was that budgetary costs linked to tax 
deductions for private spending on childcare (introduced as from January 2009) turned 
out to be much lower than originally expected, making additional funds available for 
institutional childcare. At the end of May the government decided for a federal 
contribution for the further expansion of the number of childcare places. The federal 
contribution is of the type of a start-up co-financing, and amounts to 10 million EUR in 
2011 and 15 million EUR per year in 2012 to 2014. It is planned that this should 
contribute to the establishment of around 5,000 new places per year, with a special 
focus on places for children aged up to 3 years. Interestingly, within recent budgetary 
decisions (of February 2012) the current national co-financing for the set-up of new 
childcare institutions by federal provinces and municipalities has not been prolonged 
for the time after 2014.  
One other measure, decided in 2011 is the expansion of all-day-school models and 
other forms of all-day care for children in school age. Here, the number of places is 
planned to be increased from currently approx. 120,000 to 210,000 over the next 
view years (i.e. until 2015). Regarding this topic, the federal state, the federal 
provinces and the municipalities signed a treaty according to §15a of the Austrian 
constitution. It stipulates that the federal provinces and the municipalities will enhance 
all-day care in schools falling within their responsibility (i.e. esp. primary schools and 
lower secondary schools), whereas the federal state will provide start-up financing 
amounting to a sum of 320 million EUR until 2015. Ca. two thirds of this money will be 
used to expand all-day care in schools falling within the responsibility of the federal 
provinces and municipalities, one third for schools within the competency of the 
national state (i.e. especially within the lower cycle of the secondary academic 
schools). Overall, this initiative will for sure improve the respective situation to some 
degree. Yet, it should be mentioned that the overall number of pupils in the relevant 
age group (approx. 755,000 in the age up to fourteen) is much higher than the 
maximum places of all-day care currently envisaged (210,000). 
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Long-term care 
The Austrian system of long-term care has a twofold design, consisting of cash 
benefits on the one hand, and publicly organised long-term care services on the other 
hand. The respective cash benefit is called long-term care benefit (Pflegegeld). As 
from the beginning of 2012 long-term care benefits fall within the sole competency of 
the central state, whereas before as well the federal provinces granted this kind of 
benefit (for specific groups). Pflegegeld is granted without means testing (against 
income or assets) and according to seven different levels, corresponding to a 
categorisation of seven different levels of individual care requirements / the health 
status of the person in need of care. The benefit currently amounts to EUR 154.20 per 
month in level 1 (the lowest level), but may be as high as EUR 1,655.80 in level 7. 
These cash benefits are intended to be used to buy formal care services from public or 
private providers or to reimburse informal care giving. However, it is not being 
controlled for what purposes long-term care benefits are actually used by the benefit 
recipients. 
In addition, pursuant to an agreement according to Article 15a of the Federal 
Constitution Act (endorsed in 1993) the federal provinces are responsible for 
establishing and upgrading a decentralised and nationwide delivery of institutional 
inpatient, ambulatory, semi-outpatient and outpatient (i.e. at-home) care services. 
These services are de facto implemented in cooperation with municipalities and not-
for-profit organisations of the so-called intermediary sector, i.e. social NGOs of 
different types (for an overview see e.g. Riedel/Kraus 2010, 21ff.; Biwald et al. 2011). 
There is a general lack of more in depth analysis and data on the availability and 
affordability especially regarding formal outpatient services. But findings, limited as 
they may be, suggest that availability varies to considerable degree within different 
regions and that, especially in cases of extensive need for care, the long-term care 
cash benefits only covers a fraction of the costs which would arise if all respective 
support would be purchased within formal outpatient care (see e.g. Riedel/Kraus 
2010). 
As a matter of fact, the Austrian long-term care system is characterised by a rather 
large sector of informal care. According to the most recent data available (covering 
the year 2009; see BMASK 2010a), 58% of all people in need of long-term care are 
looked after by their relatives at home, 24% are looked after by their relatives at 
home and at the same time receive formal outpatient care services, 16% live in 
nursing homes and related institutions (inpatient care) and about 2% (note: there 
may be a large number of additional unreported cases of this model) are looked after 
by privately hired caretakers (at first instance from Eastern Europe; so-called “24 
hours care at home”; see Fink 2009, 20ff. regarding regulation on “24 hours care at 
home”). 
In 2010/2011, it got evident that federal provinces and municipalities faced increasing 
problems in financing intra- and extramural benefits in kind. Against this background 
the national state, the federal provinces and the municipalities agreed in March 2011 
on the introduction of a joint “long-term care fund”, which was planned to serve as an 
interim solution for respective financing problems until 2014. In sum, EUR 685 million 
were made available until 2014, of which 2/3 are to be financed by the federal state 
and 1/3 by the federal provinces and the municipalities. In February 2012 it got 
announced that the long-term care fund will be prolonged until 2016 and that hereby 
additional funds of EUR 650 million will be made available. According to the NRP 
(2012), these funds are used to a) maintain related existing services, b) improve and 
expand the existing systems, to c) harmonize respective services across different 
regions and d) to increase transparency and comparability via a nation-wide long-term 
care database, which was implemented in 2012. Furthermore, it gets announced that 
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results of a “structural working group”, dealing with questions of reform in the area of 
long-term care, are expected for the end of 2012. Here, it appears to be fair to say 
that the Austrian NRP promises more than the related reforms can deliver. The long-
term care fund, introduced in 2011, is the facto an interim solution for respective 
financing problems, which got evident at the level of the federal provinces and the 
municipalities during 2010. Overall, the respective additional resources only appear to 
allow to maintain the existing services, or, more precisely, to expand them according 
to rising demand, which derives from demographic ageing. But in most cases this does 
not mean a structural improvement of the accessibility and quality, but at first 
instance a resumption of the status quo (however in a situation of rising demand). The 
nation-wide long-term care database, implemented in 2012 is a positive step, as - to 
provide a sound starting point for debates about structural reform - it is necessary to 
examine inequalities regarding access to outpatient and semi-outpatient services in 
more detail. Respective valid information and evidence has been largely missing for 
the case of Austria up to now. 
 
Health 
It is fair to say that the Austrian health systems provides rather equal access to high-
quality health services, and that it is subject to comparatively low private co-payments 
for standard treatments. Reforms decided over the last years follow the aim to 
maintain this rather favourable situation, but at the same time to make the system 
more efficient and to solve problems of financial sustainability. It appears that these 
strategies turned out to be rather successful regarding cost containment (as evident 
from the consolidation of the budgets of the health insurance providers), whereas 
more detailed information on the second issue, i.e. safeguarding access and quality 
(or even improving the latter), is largely missing (see Fink 2012a for more details).  
4.  Financial Resources 
4.1 National Resources 
It appears that the Austrian national government was – even during the financial and 
economic crisis – has been rather successful in ensuring that active inclusion 
measures are underpinned by the provision of the necessary resources from the 
national budget. Hereby, national government opted for a strategy were respective 
funds got pro-actively expanded (especially in late 2008 and 2009), at first instance 
concerning active labour market policies but as well in terms of public finances 
dedicated at macro-economic stabilisation.  
During the peak of the crisis, in its strategic approach the government concentrated 
on general problems of the financial markets and the labour market, this way only 
taking into account to a rather small extent the specific problems of the most 
vulnerable people. Economic stimulus packages and a tax reform aimed at stimulating 
the general economic demand but did not aim at the financial resources of poor people 
or people highly endangered by poverty. With employment and labour market policy, 
the main focus of additional measures was on maintaining employment – especially 
via the instrument of short-time work and other forms of work distribution (e.g. 
enhanced options of leave for further training). Overall, these strategies of labour 
market policy have been successful from a macro-perspective: the unemployment rate 
remained to be one of the lowest in Europe. However, these measures were not 
tailored to help especially people with above average vulnerability or special needs, so 
that their situation is not likely to have improved in comparison to the overall 
population. 
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Later on, some austerity measures got decided. The first austerity package, presented 
in late 2010, inter alia came with somewhat tightened access to and somewhat lower 
level of family allowances and a reduction of public budgets for employment policies 
(ALMP). The latter – however – took place on the background of decreasing 
unemployment. Within social protection schemes consolidation measures concentrated 
on pensions of people employed in the private sector (low indexation for 2011; 
tightened access to early retirement on grounds of very long insurance records; 
reform of invalidity pensions) and access to long-term-care benefits got tightened to 
some degree. Furthermore, cuts (adding up to earlier consolidation measures within 
this sector) as well took place regarding the health system.  
The second austerity package (called consolidation package and presented in February 
2012) did not come with large-scale retrenchment in the area of active inclusion. 
Reforms concerning social benefits within the consolidation package are rather 
narrowly targeted and at first instance concentrate on invalidity pensions and early 
retirement, following the aim to increase work incentives and to safeguard the 
financial sustainability of the pension system.  
Overall, this means that initiatives and measures in the area of social inclusion where 
– to a large degree – safeguarded from retrenchment. However, what is evident is a 
partial lack of additional funds for policy areas where an upgrading would be 
necessary, like e.g. concerning childcare, long-term care or for housing services. Here, 
it appears that especially the financial situation of the municipalities (providing the 
majorities of respective services) gets increasingly tight.24 
 
To give some evidence on the overall cost of implementing active inclusion strategies 
in Austria, Chart 1 to Chart 3 below provide some data on social spending in Austria 
(and at average of EU-27) in 2009 (more recent international comparative data is not 
available at the time of writing). This data shows that spending for “unemployment” is 
rather high in Austria (given the rather low unemployment rate), whereas spending for 
social exclusion (not covered in one of the other policy areas) is below average of EU-
27. The rather high costs for “unemployment” are at first instance caused by rather 
high outlays for benefits in kind, i.e. for ALMP-measures. One other specific of the 
Austrian case is rather high spending dedicated at families. Hereby, spending for 
benefits in kind (i.e. at first instance childcare facilities) are below average of EU-27, 
whereas cash benefits are much higher than at average of EU-27. The latter is caused 
by rather generous and universal family allowances, which - however – as shown 
above have a very high impact regarding the number of people affected by being at-
risk-of poverty (see above tables 4 and 5). Spending on sickness/health care is at 
about the level of EU-27, both for cash benefits and benefits in kind. At the same time 
outlays for old-age pensions are comparatively high in the case of Austria and 
measures explicitly dedicated towards active inclusion (i.e. on unemployment and 
social exclusion) appear to be rather negligible when compared to the sums spent on 
the pension’s scheme. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
 
24 See e.g. http://www.kdz.eu/de/%C3%B6sterreichische-gemeindefinanzen-haben-sich-leicht-erholt 
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Chart 1 
 
Source: Eurostat Database 
 
Chart 2 
 
Source: Eurostat Database 
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Chart 3 
 
Source: Eurostat Database 
 
4.2 Use of EU Structural Funds 
Persons distant from the labour market are the target group of ESF measures under 
priority 3b of the Operational Programme for “Employment Austria 2007-2013”. The 
projects are implemented by the Territorial Employment pacts (TEP) and in the two 
year period 2010-2011 around 60 projects were established. In 2010, about 3 500 
persons distant to the labour market entered the projects. The projects are planned as 
pilot projects which are oriented towards the special needs of the groups on the 
margins of the labour market. In the long run experiences of the pilot projects should 
be integrated into mainstream measures. For examples of projects see: 
http://www.esf.at/esf/projekte/ 
5. Monitoring and evaluation 
No instruments have been introduced to specifically monitor the implementation of the 
active inclusion Recommendation in Austria. At the same time no instruments exists to 
monitor the impacts of the crisis and of reform measures taken from an overall social 
inclusion perspective. The same holds for the NRPs presented during the last years, 
which are more of the type of reports compiling measures (not more enhancing 
strategies) already in place or recently decided. At the same time they do not deliver a 
structured assessment of the most important challenges. 
However, one instrument worth mentioning is the so-called “social monitoring of the 
crisis” by the Federal the Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs and Consumer 
Protection. Respective reports where produced four times a year during the peak of 
the crisis and since 2011 twice a year. These reports provide some interesting data 
and statistics, however not much interpretation of the respective numbers. For this 
reason the respective reports do not really have the character of a strategical 
monitoring or of a real evaluation. 
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Regarding specific programmes and projects (especially concerning ALMP) a large 
number of specific evaluations get conducted. Many of them are available via the so-
called PES-Research-Network (AMS Forschungsnetzwerk; see: www.ams-
forschungsnetzwerk.at/). 
6. Recommendations 
6.1 Priority actions to strengthen (develop) the integrated 
comprehensive active inclusion strategy 
 The national government should start an integrated process of pro-actively 
assessing the strengths/weaknesses/challenges of the Austrian model of “active 
inclusion”, addressing all three policy strands and their interaction. 
 On the background of this assessment the national government should start a 
process of integrated planning, again addressing all three policy strands. This 
would have to be done in co-operation with the federal provinces and 
municipalities (especially regarding social services) and the social partners 
(especially regarding the question of quality of work). Alternatively – if the federal 
provinces and the social partners would signal that they are opposed to such a co-
operation - , competencies of general planning would eventually have to be 
shifted to the central government in a number of policy areas. 
 
6.2 Priority actions to strengthen policies/measures under each of 
the 3 strands 
 
Adequate income support 
 Increase in minimum replacement rates within unemployment insurance 
(especially after preceding low-wage employment): wage replacement rates 
within the unemployment insurance are comparatively low in Austria, especially in 
case of preceding low-wage employment. This – inter alia – has led to the 
situation that top-ups from minimum income schemes got increasingly widespread 
in case of unemployment25, but even when the latter are taken into account, 
benefits in many cases remain below the at-risk-of poverty threshold. The 
minimum income schemes (at first instance financed by the federal provinces) 
were originally designed to serve as a safety net of last resort, and under specific 
circumstances only, whereas standard social risks were planned to be dealt with 
within social insurance. An increase in minimum replacement rates within 
unemployment insurance (especially after preceding low-wage employment) 
would likely not be extremely costly, but could have a large impact on social 
                                           
 
25 Data on such top-ups, which may be granted additionally to benefits from unemployment insurance, are 
only available for the case of the federal province of Vienna, where at the same time most of the 
respective cases appear to be present. Here, the number of respective cases increased from 18,293 
persons in 1999 to 66,982 persons in 2009 (+48,689 persons or +266%) (see Pratscher 2011, 1221). 
During the same time period the number of all people receiving social assistance in Austria increased 
from ca. 71,500 in 1999 to ca. 173,800 in 2009, whereby most of this increase took place in the federal 
province of Vienna, where the number of recipients of social assistance (not living in institutions like 
nursery homes etc.) amounted to ca. 35,800 in 1999 and to ca. 100,000 in 2009. Outlays for cash 
benefits towards people receiving social assistance (not living in institutions like nursery homes etc.) 
within social assistance in Austria accelerated from ca. EUR 353 million in 2000 to ca. EUR 585 million in 
2009, and in the federal province of Vienna from ca. EUR 171 million to ca. 319 million. 
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inclusion.26 At the same time international examples indicate that there is still 
room to manoeuvre in this respect in the Austrian case, without getting serious 
problems concerning incentives to take up work. 
 
Inclusive labour markets 
 Put the question of wage distribution and distribution of working time on the 
national political agenda. If the social partners do no succeed in agreeing on 
higher minimum wages, respective decisions could be taken within national 
legislation. To reach a more equal distribution of working time, in a first step 
measures should be taken to reduce overtime work of full-time employed.27 
 
Access to quality services 
 Questions of institutional childcare facilities and of services in the area of long-
term care are long-standing issues in Austria. In this areas, more enhancing and 
structural reforms appear to be very hard to be pushed through due to partly 
mixed competencies (between the federal state and the federal provinces) and 
mutual blaming between different institutional players. At the same time path-
dependency occurs in that sense that reproduction work is by many people still 
seen as a task to be performed by women in an informal way at first instance. If 
the goal of equal employment chances of women is taken serious, then the 
national government would have to take over the issue of social services in these 
two areas (in terms of framework decision making), develop a clear infrastructure 
programme (eventually together with the federal provinces and municipalities) 
and guarantee the financing of respective services (as the own tax revenues of 
the lower administrative levels are very limited). If the government fails regarding 
this point, it is very likely that as well the goals regarding the improvement of 
women’s quality of employment will not be reached. 
 
6.3 Actions that could usefully be taken at EU level to reinforce the 
implementation of the active inclusion Recommendation by 
Member States 
 Define a more clear-cut strategy of active inclusion. 
 Hereby, define the terms “adequate income support”, “inclusive labour markets” 
and “quality services” more thoroughly, giving these buzzwords a concrete 
meaning. 
 Assess member states’ policies according to this more concrete definition and 
make results accessible to the public without any restrictions. 
 
 
                                           
 
26 According to data by EU-SILC 2010 about 29% of all people in working age (20-64 years) with income 
below the at-risk-of poverty threshold are unemployed (with an unemployment spell of six month and 
over). At the same time for this group both the at-risk-of poverty rate (40%) and the poverty gap 
(20%) are comparatively high. Increasing wage replacement rates within unemployment insurance could 
therefore have a considerable positive impact on social inclusion. 
27 Austria shows a very high incidence of overtime work, which is mainly performed by men in full-time 
employment. In 2011, about 217.8 million overtime working hours were performed by men, which 
equals about 5.0% of their overall working hours. In the case of women, the respective number was 
85.3 million working hours, which sums up to 3.1% of all hours worked by women. Overall, 4.3% of all 
working hours performed in 2011 were overtime hours (cf. Statistic Austria 2012). 
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Summary Tables 
 
Table 1 
To what extent has an integrated comprehensive active inclusion strategy been developed in your Member State? 
 Comprehensive policy design Integrated implementation Vertical policy coordination Active participation  
of relevant actors 
Yes Somewhat No Yes Somewhat No Yes Somewhat No Yes Somewhat No 
For those 
who can 
work 
 X   X   X   X 
 
For those 
who 
cannot 
work 
 X   X   X   X 
 
 
 
Table 2 
To what extent have active inclusion policies/measures been strengthened, stayed much the same or weakened since 2008 in your Member State? 
 Adequate income support Inclusive labour markets Access to quality services 
Strengthened The same Weakened Strengthened The same Weakened Strengthened The same Weakened 
For those 
who can 
work 
X   X   X   
For those 
who 
cannot 
work 
X    X   X  
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Additional tables and charts 
 
 
 
Table 1: Children in institutional childcare in % of the respective age-group 
Year Austria 
Burgen- 
land 
Carinthia Lower Austria Upper Austria Salzburg Styria Tyrol 
Vorarl- 
berg 
Vienna 
 
age 0 to 2 years 
1995 4.6 6.0 1.3 2.8 2.4 2.3 1.3 1.1 0.3 16.9 
2000 7.7 8.8 1.7 4.7 4.1 6.8 2.1 2.4 3.0 24.3 
2005 10.2 13.4 10.1 6.4 5.3 8.5 4.5 10.4 8.0 22.1 
2006 10.8 14.6 10.8 6.8 5.5 9.0 5.2 11.4 9.4 22.3 
2007 11.8 15.3 12.7 8.7 6.0 9.9 5.6 12.3 11.6 23.1 
2008 14.0 16.6 12.3 13.8 6.7 11.3 6.5 14.2 13.8 25.5 
2009 15.8 23.5 14.0 15.5 9.4 12.9 7.7 15.1 15.1 26.8 
2010 17.1 26.9 15.3 16.7 10.3 13.7 8.8 16.8 17.0 28.1 
2011 19.7 29.0 16.5 21.2 11.2 14.1 10.0 18.0 17.3 33.2 
 
age 3 to 5 years 
1995 70.6 88.3 52.3 81.4 71.4 67.5 61.9 64.4 63.5 75.9 
2000 77.6 94.4 63.6 86.6 79.0 76.8 69.7 73.2 70.5 79.9 
2005 82.7 96.4 72.8 88.7 83.2 82.7 77.6 83.9 79.7 81.4 
2006 83.5 95.8 74.9 90.4 84.2 84.0 78.0 84.9 81.6 80.6 
2007 84.9 96.5 78.2 91.5 84.7 84.5 79.8 85.7 81.9 83.1 
2008 86.5 97.3 81.0 91.4 85.7 85.4 81.6 88.0 86.4 85.3 
2009 88.5 99.5 81.3 93.4 90.6 86.9 83.7 88.8 89.8 86.0 
2010 90.7 98.8 83.2 95.2 91.3 89.0 85.3 89.8 91.3 91.3 
2011 90.3 99.2 84.1 95.6 92.1 89.3 83.9 90.5 89.7 88.9 
 
age 6 to 9 years 
1995 7.0 1.5 6.1 2.1 6.3 5.5 2.6 2.3 0.6 24.9 
2000 8.4 2.2 8.1 5.3 8.2 5.6 3.4 2.2 1.5 25.0 
2005 11.9 5.2 14.6 11.6 10.7 8.0 4.8 3.2 4.8 27.2 
2006 12.9 5.4 16.4 12.7 11.9 8.6 5.2 3.5 6.6 27.8 
2007 13.8 6.5 17.8 13.1 12.9 9.7 5.5 4.0 6.6 29.3 
2008 14.5 7.5 18.9 13.4 14.1 10.2 5.6 4.4 7.7 29.9 
2009 15.4 10.4 18.8 14.5 15.9 10.2 5.7 5.1 9.5 30.3 
2010 16.3 12.0 19.4 15.5 17.5 10.4 5.7 5.9 11.3 30.7 
2011 16.0 12.3 19.6 16.0 18.7 10.2 5.6 6.8 13.5 26.7 
Source: Statistik Austria;  
http://www.statistik.at/web_de/static/kinderbetreuungsquoten_nach_altersgruppen_1
995_bis_2011_021659.xlsx 
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Chart 1 
 
Source: DG ECFIN: Tax & benefits indicators DATABASE 
 
Chart 2 
 
* early basis; full-time employed; companies with more  
than 10 employees;  
2006 Source: Eurostat Database  
(Eurostat Structures of earnings survey) 
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Chart 3 
 
*EE & GR: data for 2008; PL: data for 2009; in industry, construction  
and services (except public administration, defense, compulsory social security) 
Source: Eurostat database 
 
Chart 4 
 
* Part-time rate of women divided by part-time rate of men 
Source: Eurostat Database & own calculations. 
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Chart 5 
 
Eurostat Database; EU-SILC 
 
Chart 6 
 
Eurostat Database; EU-SILC 
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Chart 7 
 
Eurostat Database; EU-SILC 
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